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Edit comments and minor code cleanup.

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Edit test_arbitrary_package_attack.py
This commit is contained in:
Vladimir Diaz 2014-04-01 08:33:23 -04:00
parent 55941d7551
commit b7047f7ea2
1 changed files with 22 additions and 25 deletions
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47
tests/integration/test_arbitrary_package_attack.py
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@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
<Purpose>
Simulate an arbitrary package attack, where an updater client attempts to
download a malicious file. TUF and non-TUF client scenarios is tested.
download a malicious file. TUF and non-TUF client scenarios are tested.
There is no difference between 'updates' and 'target' files.
"""
@ -57,8 +57,7 @@ class TestArbitraryPackageAttack(unittest_toolbox.Modified_TestCase):
@classmethod
def setUpClass(cls):
# setUpClass() is called before any of the test cases in this unit test
# are executed.
# setUpClass() is called before any of the test cases are executed.
# Create a temporary directory to store the repository, metadata, and target
# files. 'temporary_directory' must be deleted in TearDownModule() so that
@ -88,11 +87,11 @@ def setUpClass(cls):
@classmethod
def tearDownClass(cls):
# tearDownModule() is called after all the tests have run.
# tearDownModule() is called after all the test cases have run.
# http://docs.python.org/2/library/unittest.html#class-and-module-fixtures
# Remove the temporary repository directory, which should contain all the
# metadata, targets, and key files generated for all test cases.
# metadata, targets, and key files generated of all the test cases.
shutil.rmtree(cls.temporary_directory)
unittest_toolbox.Modified_TestCase.clear_toolbox()
@ -131,8 +130,8 @@ def setUp(self):
# to the temporary repository the test cases can use.
shutil.copytree(original_repository, self.repository_directory)
shutil.copytree(original_client, self.client_directory)
#shutil.copytree(original_keystore, self.keystore_directory)
# Set the url prefix required by the 'tuf/client/updater.py' updater.
# 'path/to/tmp/repository' -> 'localhost:8001/tmp/repository'.
repository_basepath = self.repository_directory[len(os.getcwd()):]
url_prefix = \
@ -146,28 +145,29 @@ def setUp(self):
'targets_path': 'targets',
'confined_target_dirs': ['']}}
# Creating repository instance. The test cases will use this client
# Create the repository instance. The test cases will use this client
# updater to refresh metadata, fetch target files, etc.
self.repository_updater = updater.Updater('test_repository',
self.repository_mirrors)
def tearDown(self):
# Modified_TestCase.tearDown() automatically deletes temporary files and
# directories that may have been created during each test case.
unittest_toolbox.Modified_TestCase.tearDown(self)
def test_without_tuf(self):
# Verify that a target file on themodified by an attacker is
# not downloaded by the TUF client.repository replaced with a malicious
# version is downloaded by a non-tuf client. A tuf client, on the other
# hand, should detect that the downloaded target file is invalid.
# Verify that a target file replaced with a malicious version is downloaded
# by a non-TUF client (i.e., a non-TUF client that does not verify hashes,
# detect mix-and-mix attacks, etc.) A tuf client, on the other hand, should
# detect that the downloaded target file is invalid.
# Test: Download a valid target file from the repository.
# Ensure the target file to be downloaded has not already been downloaded,
# and generate its file size and digest of the target available on the
# repository. The file size and digest is needed to check that the
# malicious file was indeed downloaded.
# and generate its file size and digest. The file size and digest is needed
# to check that the malicious file was indeed downloaded.
target_path = os.path.join(self.repository_directory, 'targets', 'file1.txt')
client_target_path = os.path.join(self.client_directory, 'file1.txt')
self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(client_target_path))
@ -189,9 +189,7 @@ def test_without_tuf(self):
length, hashes = tuf.util.get_file_details(target_path)
malicious_fileinfo = tuf.formats.make_fileinfo(length, hashes)
url = self.repository_mirrors['mirror1']['url_prefix']
file3_url = os.path.join(url, 'targets', 'file1.txt')
urllib.urlretrieve(file3_url, client_target_path)
urllib.urlretrieve(url_file, client_target_path)
length, hashes = tuf.util.get_file_details(client_target_path)
download_fileinfo = tuf.formats.make_fileinfo(length, hashes)
@ -205,13 +203,13 @@ def test_without_tuf(self):
def test_with_tuf(self):
# Verify that a target file on the repository modified by an attacker is
# not downloaded by the TUF client.
# Verify that a target file (on the remote repository) modified by an
# attacker is not downloaded by the TUF client.
# First test that the valid target file is successfully downloaded.
file1_fileinfo = self.repository_updater.target('file1.txt')
destination = os.path.join(self.client_directory)
self.repository_updater.download_target(file1_fileinfo, destination)
client_target_path = os.path.join(self.client_directory, 'file1.txt')
client_target_path = os.path.join(destination, 'file1.txt')
self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(client_target_path))
# Modify 'file1.txt' and confirm that the TUF client rejects it.
@ -226,7 +224,7 @@ def test_with_tuf(self):
url_prefix = self.repository_mirrors['mirror1']['url_prefix']
url_file = os.path.join(url_prefix, 'targets', 'file1.txt')
# Verify that only one exception raised for 'url_file'.
# Verify that only one exception is raised for 'url_file'.
self.assertTrue(len(exception.mirror_errors), 1)
# Verify that the expected 'tuf.DownloadLengthMismatchError' exception
@ -238,10 +236,9 @@ def test_with_tuf(self):
def test_with_tuf_and_metadata_tampering(self):
# Test that a TUF client does not download a malicious target file, and
# a 'targets.json' metadata file that has also been modified by the
# attacker. The attacker does not attach a valid signature to
# 'targets.json'
# Test that a TUF client does not download a malicious target file, and a
# 'targets.json' metadata file that has also been modified by the attacker.
# The attacker does not attach a valid signature to 'targets.json'
# An attacker modifies 'file1.txt'.
target_path = os.path.join(self.repository_directory, 'targets', 'file1.txt')