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Added SSF to Okta research doc. (#33720)
<!-- Add the related story/sub-task/bug number, like Resolves #123, or remove if NA --> **Related issue:** Resolves #32766
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@ -161,13 +161,37 @@ sequenceDiagram
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## Other alternatives to Okta Verify
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### Shared Signals Framework (SSF)
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**Overview.** [SSF](https://openid.net/wg/sharedsignals/) is an OpenID protocol for transmitting security events and posture signals between providers asynchronously. It enables continuous monitoring by broadcasting events like "device became non-compliant" to multiple receivers (Okta, Cisco, SGNL, Google Workspace, etc.).
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**Why it doesn't solve our use case.**
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SSF has no native mechanism to identify which device the user is logging in from during authentication. The critical gap:
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1. **Device identification problem**: SSF events are keyed by user identifiers (email, subject) or session identifiers, but there's no standard way for the browser to communicate "I'm device X" to Okta during login.
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2. **No presence proof**: Unlike Okta Verify (which proves device presence via localhost/deep links) or our mTLS approach (which uses client certificates), SSF has no mechanism to link the browser session to a specific Fleet-managed device.
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**When SSF is useful.**
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SSF would be valuable for continuous monitoring use cases:
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- Notifying Okta when a Fleet device becomes non-compliant (triggering session revocation)
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- Sharing security events with other systems (EDR, SIEM)
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- Multi-vendor risk correlation
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**Recommendation.** SSF does not replace the need for synchronous device identification and authentication. Consider SSF as a future enhancement for continuous monitoring, but it cannot substitute for our possession factor + mTLS approach.
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### Other certificate-based alternatives
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* Issue a device certificate if it is passing policies, and use the certificate as a factor in Okta flow.
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* [Use your own certificate authority for managed devices](https://help.okta.com/oie/en-us/content/topics/identity-engine/devices/config-customer-provided-ca.htm)
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* Cert remains valid until revoked/expired (potential security gap for several hours)
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* Okta checks CRL (Certificate Revocation List) endpoint a few times per day
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* Can't show custom remediation messages
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* Using inline hooks
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* Can work for OIDC to block access, but not for SAML.
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### Inline hooks
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* Can work for OIDC to block access, but not for SAML.
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