(backend) add resource server api

Adds a resource server API similar to the one that already
exists for Drive.
This commit is contained in:
Sylvain Boissel 2026-02-26 12:39:14 +01:00
parent 4f8aea7b80
commit 4e54a53072
No known key found for this signature in database
26 changed files with 3577 additions and 19 deletions

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@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ and this project adheres to
- ✨(backend) add a is_first_connection flag to the User model #1938
- ✨(frontend) add onboarding modal with help menu button #1868
- ✨(backend) add resource server api #1923
### Changed

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@ -162,6 +162,10 @@ endif
@echo ""
.PHONY: post-beautiful-bootstrap
create-docker-network: ## create the docker network if it doesn't exist
@docker network create lasuite-network || true
.PHONY: create-docker-network
bootstrap: ## Prepare the project for local development
bootstrap: \
pre-beautiful-bootstrap \
@ -219,6 +223,7 @@ logs: ## display app-dev logs (follow mode)
.PHONY: logs
run-backend: ## Start only the backend application and all needed services
@$(MAKE) create-docker-network
@$(COMPOSE) up --force-recreate -d docspec
@$(COMPOSE) up --force-recreate -d celery-dev
@$(COMPOSE) up --force-recreate -d y-provider-development

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@ -47,6 +47,10 @@ server {
try_files $uri @proxy_to_docs_backend;
}
location /external_api {
try_files $uri @proxy_to_docs_backend;
}
location /static {
try_files $uri @proxy_to_docs_backend;
}

106
docs/resource_server.md Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
# Use Docs as a Resource Server
Docs implements resource server, so it means it can be used from an external app to perform some operation using the dedicated API.
> **Note:** This feature might be subject to future evolutions. The API endpoints, configuration options, and behavior may change in future versions.
## Prerequisites
In order to activate the resource server on Docs you need to setup the following environment variables
```python
OIDC_RESOURCE_SERVER_ENABLED=True
OIDC_OP_URL=
OIDC_OP_INTROSPECTION_ENDPOINT=
OIDC_RS_CLIENT_ID=
OIDC_RS_CLIENT_SECRET=
OIDC_RS_AUDIENCE_CLAIM=
OIDC_RS_ALLOWED_AUDIENCES=
```
It implements the resource server using `django-lasuite`, see the [documentation](https://github.com/suitenumerique/django-lasuite/blob/main/documentation/how-to-use-oidc-resource-server-backend.md)
## Customise allowed routes
Configure the `EXTERNAL_API` setting to control which routes and actions are available in the external API. Set it via the `EXTERNAL_API` environment variable (as JSON) or in Django settings.
Default configuration:
```python
EXTERNAL_API = {
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": ["list", "retrieve", "create", "children"],
},
"document_access": {
"enabled": False,
"actions": [],
},
"document_invitation": {
"enabled": False,
"actions": [],
},
"users": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": ["get_me"],
},
}
```
**Endpoints:**
- `documents`: Controls `/external_api/v1.0/documents/`. Available actions: `list`, `retrieve`, `create`, `update`, `destroy`, `trashbin`, `children`, `restore`, `move`,`versions_list`, `versions_detail`, `favorite_detail`,`link_configuration`, `attachment_upload`, `media_auth`, `ai_transform`, `ai_translate`, `ai_proxy`. Always allowed actions: `favorite_list`, `duplicate`.
- `document_access`: `/external_api/v1.0/documents/{id}/accesses/`. Available actions: `list`, `retrieve`, `create`, `update`, `partial_update`, `destroy`
- `document_invitation`: Controls `/external_api/v1.0/documents/{id}/invitations/`. Available actions: `list`, `retrieve`, `create`, `partial_update`, `destroy`
- `users`: Controls `/external_api/v1.0/documents/`. Available actions: `get_me`.
Each endpoint has `enabled` (boolean) and `actions` (list of allowed actions). Only actions explicitly listed are accessible.
## Request Docs
In order to request Docs from an external resource provider, you need to implement the basic setup of `django-lasuite` [Using the OIDC Authentication Backend to request a resource server](https://github.com/suitenumerique/django-lasuite/blob/main/documentation/how-to-use-oidc-call-to-resource-server.md)
Then you can requests some routes that are available at `/external_api/v1.0/*`, here are some examples of what you can do.
### Create a document
Here is an example of a view that creates a document from a markdown file at the root level in Docs.
```python
@method_decorator(refresh_oidc_access_token)
def create_document_from_markdown(self, request):
"""
Create a new document from a Markdown file at root level.
"""
# Get the access token from the session
access_token = request.session.get('oidc_access_token')
# Create a new document from a file
file_content = b"# Test Document\n\nThis is a test."
file = BytesIO(file_content)
file.name = "readme.md"
response = requests.post(
f"{settings.DOCS_API}/documents/",
{
"file": file,
},
format="multipart",
)
response.raise_for_status()
data = response.json()
return {"id": data["id"]}
```
### Get user information
The same way, you can use the /me endpoint to get user information.
```python
response = requests.get(
"{settings.DOCS_API}/users/me/",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {access_token}", "Content-Type": "application/json"},
)
```

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@ -51,6 +51,15 @@ LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URL=http://localhost:3000
OIDC_REDIRECT_ALLOWED_HOSTS="localhost:8083,localhost:3000"
OIDC_AUTH_REQUEST_EXTRA_PARAMS={"acr_values": "eidas1"}
# Resource Server Backend
OIDC_OP_URL=http://localhost:8083/realms/docs
OIDC_OP_INTROSPECTION_ENDPOINT = http://nginx:8083/realms/docs/protocol/openid-connect/token/introspect
OIDC_RESOURCE_SERVER_ENABLED=False
OIDC_RS_CLIENT_ID=docs
OIDC_RS_CLIENT_SECRET=ThisIsAnExampleKeyForDevPurposeOnly
OIDC_RS_AUDIENCE_CLAIM="client_id" # The claim used to identify the audience
OIDC_RS_ALLOWED_AUDIENCES=""
# Store OIDC tokens in the session. Needed by search/ endpoint.
OIDC_STORE_ACCESS_TOKEN=True
OIDC_STORE_REFRESH_TOKEN=True # Store the encrypted refresh token in the session.

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@ -457,36 +457,45 @@ class DocumentViewSet(
### Additional Actions:
1. **Trashbin**: List soft deleted documents for a document owner
Example: GET /documents/{id}/trashbin/
Example: GET /documents/trashbin/
2. **Children**: List or create child documents.
2. **Restore**: Restore a soft deleted document.
Example: POST /documents/{id}/restore/
3. **Move**: Move a document to another parent document.
Example: POST /documents/{id}/move/
4. **Duplicate**: Duplicate a document.
Example: POST /documents/{id}/duplicate/
5. **Children**: List or create child documents.
Example: GET, POST /documents/{id}/children/
3. **Versions List**: Retrieve version history of a document.
6. **Versions List**: Retrieve version history of a document.
Example: GET /documents/{id}/versions/
4. **Version Detail**: Get or delete a specific document version.
7. **Version Detail**: Get or delete a specific document version.
Example: GET, DELETE /documents/{id}/versions/{version_id}/
5. **Favorite**: Get list of favorite documents for a user. Mark or unmark
8. **Favorite**: Get list of favorite documents for a user. Mark or unmark
a document as favorite.
Examples:
- GET /documents/favorite/
- GET /documents/favorite_list/
- POST, DELETE /documents/{id}/favorite/
6. **Create for Owner**: Create a document via server-to-server on behalf of a user.
9. **Create for Owner**: Create a document via server-to-server on behalf of a user.
Example: POST /documents/create-for-owner/
7. **Link Configuration**: Update document link configuration.
10. **Link Configuration**: Update document link configuration.
Example: PUT /documents/{id}/link-configuration/
8. **Attachment Upload**: Upload a file attachment for the document.
11. **Attachment Upload**: Upload a file attachment for the document.
Example: POST /documents/{id}/attachment-upload/
9. **Media Auth**: Authorize access to document media.
12. **Media Auth**: Authorize access to document media.
Example: GET /documents/media-auth/
10. **AI Transform**: Apply a transformation action on a piece of text with AI.
13. **AI Transform**: Apply a transformation action on a piece of text with AI.
Example: POST /documents/{id}/ai-transform/
Expected data:
- text (str): The input text.
@ -494,7 +503,7 @@ class DocumentViewSet(
Returns: JSON response with the processed text.
Throttled by: AIDocumentRateThrottle, AIUserRateThrottle.
11. **AI Translate**: Translate a piece of text with AI.
14. **AI Translate**: Translate a piece of text with AI.
Example: POST /documents/{id}/ai-translate/
Expected data:
- text (str): The input text.
@ -502,7 +511,7 @@ class DocumentViewSet(
Returns: JSON response with the translated text.
Throttled by: AIDocumentRateThrottle, AIUserRateThrottle.
12. **AI Proxy**: Proxy an AI request to an external AI service.
15. **AI Proxy**: Proxy an AI request to an external AI service.
Example: POST /api/v1.0/documents/<resource_id>/ai-proxy
### Ordering: created_at, updated_at, is_favorite, title

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@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
"""Resource Server Permissions for the Docs app."""
from django.conf import settings
from lasuite.oidc_resource_server.authentication import ResourceServerAuthentication
from rest_framework import permissions
class ResourceServerClientPermission(permissions.BasePermission):
"""
Permission class for resource server views.
This provides a way to open the resource server views to a limited set of
Service Providers.
Note: we might add a more complex permission system in the future, based on
the Service Provider ID and the requested scopes.
"""
def has_permission(self, request, view):
"""
Check if the user is authenticated and the token introspection
provides an authorized Service Provider.
"""
if not isinstance(
request.successful_authenticator, ResourceServerAuthentication
):
# Not a resource server request
return False
# Check if the user is authenticated
if not request.user.is_authenticated:
return False
if (
hasattr(view, "resource_server_actions")
and view.action not in view.resource_server_actions
):
return False
# When used as a resource server, the request has a token audience
return (
request.resource_server_token_audience in settings.OIDC_RS_ALLOWED_AUDIENCES
)

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@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
"""Resource Server Viewsets for the Docs app."""
from django.conf import settings
from lasuite.oidc_resource_server.authentication import ResourceServerAuthentication
from core.api.permissions import (
CanCreateInvitationPermission,
DocumentPermission,
IsSelf,
ResourceAccessPermission,
)
from core.api.viewsets import (
DocumentAccessViewSet,
DocumentViewSet,
InvitationViewset,
UserViewSet,
)
from core.external_api.permissions import ResourceServerClientPermission
# pylint: disable=too-many-ancestors
class ResourceServerRestrictionMixin:
"""
Mixin for Resource Server Viewsets to provide shortcut to get
configured actions for a given resource.
"""
def _get_resource_server_actions(self, resource_name):
"""Get resource_server_actions from settings."""
external_api_config = settings.EXTERNAL_API.get(resource_name, {})
return list(external_api_config.get("actions", []))
class ResourceServerDocumentViewSet(ResourceServerRestrictionMixin, DocumentViewSet):
"""Resource Server Viewset for Documents."""
authentication_classes = [ResourceServerAuthentication]
permission_classes = [ResourceServerClientPermission & DocumentPermission] # type: ignore
@property
def resource_server_actions(self):
"""Build resource_server_actions from settings."""
return self._get_resource_server_actions("documents")
class ResourceServerDocumentAccessViewSet(
ResourceServerRestrictionMixin, DocumentAccessViewSet
):
"""Resource Server Viewset for DocumentAccess."""
authentication_classes = [ResourceServerAuthentication]
permission_classes = [ResourceServerClientPermission & ResourceAccessPermission] # type: ignore
@property
def resource_server_actions(self):
"""Get resource_server_actions from settings."""
return self._get_resource_server_actions("document_access")
class ResourceServerInvitationViewSet(
ResourceServerRestrictionMixin, InvitationViewset
):
"""Resource Server Viewset for Invitations."""
authentication_classes = [ResourceServerAuthentication]
permission_classes = [
ResourceServerClientPermission & CanCreateInvitationPermission
]
@property
def resource_server_actions(self):
"""Get resource_server_actions from settings."""
return self._get_resource_server_actions("document_invitation")
class ResourceServerUserViewSet(ResourceServerRestrictionMixin, UserViewSet):
"""Resource Server Viewset for User."""
authentication_classes = [ResourceServerAuthentication]
permission_classes = [ResourceServerClientPermission & IsSelf] # type: ignore
@property
def resource_server_actions(self):
"""Get resource_server_actions from settings."""
return self._get_resource_server_actions("users")

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@ -1,10 +1,15 @@
"""Fixtures for tests in the impress core application"""
import base64
from unittest import mock
from django.core.cache import cache
import pytest
import responses
from core import factories
from core.tests.utils.urls import reload_urls
USER = "user"
TEAM = "team"
@ -49,3 +54,92 @@ def indexer_settings_fixture(settings):
# clear cache to prevent issues with other tests
get_document_indexer.cache_clear()
def resource_server_backend_setup(settings):
"""
A fixture to create a user token for testing.
"""
assert (
settings.OIDC_RS_BACKEND_CLASS
== "lasuite.oidc_resource_server.backend.ResourceServerBackend"
)
settings.OIDC_RESOURCE_SERVER_ENABLED = True
settings.OIDC_RS_CLIENT_ID = "some_client_id"
settings.OIDC_RS_CLIENT_SECRET = "some_client_secret"
settings.OIDC_OP_URL = "https://oidc.example.com"
settings.OIDC_VERIFY_SSL = False
settings.OIDC_TIMEOUT = 5
settings.OIDC_PROXY = None
settings.OIDC_OP_JWKS_ENDPOINT = "https://oidc.example.com/jwks"
settings.OIDC_OP_INTROSPECTION_ENDPOINT = "https://oidc.example.com/introspect"
settings.OIDC_RS_SCOPES = ["openid", "groups"]
settings.OIDC_RS_ALLOWED_AUDIENCES = ["some_service_provider"]
@pytest.fixture
def resource_server_backend_conf(settings):
"""
A fixture to create a user token for testing.
"""
resource_server_backend_setup(settings)
reload_urls()
@pytest.fixture
def resource_server_backend(settings):
"""
A fixture to create a user token for testing.
Including a mocked introspection endpoint.
"""
resource_server_backend_setup(settings)
reload_urls()
with responses.RequestsMock() as rsps:
rsps.add(
responses.POST,
"https://oidc.example.com/introspect",
json={
"iss": "https://oidc.example.com",
"aud": "some_client_id", # settings.OIDC_RS_CLIENT_ID
"sub": "very-specific-sub",
"client_id": "some_service_provider",
"scope": "openid groups",
"active": True,
},
)
yield rsps
@pytest.fixture
def user_specific_sub():
"""
A fixture to create a user token for testing.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory(sub="very-specific-sub", full_name="External User")
yield user
def build_authorization_bearer(token):
"""
Build an Authorization Bearer header value from a token.
This can be used like this:
client.post(
...
HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {build_authorization_bearer('some_token')}",
)
"""
return base64.b64encode(token.encode("utf-8")).decode("utf-8")
@pytest.fixture
def user_token():
"""
A fixture to create a user token for testing.
"""
return build_authorization_bearer("some_token")

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@ -0,0 +1,772 @@
"""
Tests for the Resource Server API for documents.
Not testing external API endpoints that are already tested in the /api
because the resource server viewsets inherit from the api viewsets.
"""
from datetime import timedelta
from io import BytesIO
from unittest.mock import patch
from django.test import override_settings
from django.utils import timezone
import pytest
from rest_framework.test import APIClient
from core import factories, models
from core.services import mime_types
pytestmark = pytest.mark.django_db
# pylint: disable=unused-argument
def test_external_api_documents_retrieve_anonymous_public_standalone():
"""
Anonymous users SHOULD NOT be allowed to retrieve a document from external
API if resource server is not enabled.
"""
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach="public")
response = APIClient().get(f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/")
assert response.status_code == 404
def test_external_api_documents_list_connected_not_resource_server():
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to list documents if resource server is not enabled.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=document, user=user, role="reader")
response = client.get("/external_api/v1.0/documents/")
assert response.status_code == 404
def test_external_api_documents_list_connected_resource_server(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""Connected users should be allowed to list documents from a resource server."""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role="reader"
)
response = client.get("/external_api/v1.0/documents/")
assert response.status_code == 200
def test_external_api_documents_list_connected_resource_server_with_invalid_token(
user_token, resource_server_backend
):
"""A user with an invalid sub SHOULD NOT be allowed to retrieve documents
from a resource server."""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
response = client.get("/external_api/v1.0/documents/")
assert response.status_code == 401
def test_external_api_documents_retrieve_connected_resource_server_with_wrong_abilities(
user_token, user_specific_sub, resource_server_backend
):
"""
A user with wrong abilities SHOULD NOT be allowed to retrieve a document from
a resource server.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED)
response = client.get(f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/")
assert response.status_code == 403
def test_external_api_documents_retrieve_connected_resource_server_using_access_token(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
A user with an access token SHOULD be allowed to retrieve a document from
a resource server.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role=models.LinkRoleChoices.READER
)
response = client.get(f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/")
assert response.status_code == 200
def test_external_api_documents_create_root_success(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Users with an access token should be able to create a root document through the resource
server and should automatically be declared as the owner of the newly created document.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
response = client.post(
"/external_api/v1.0/documents/",
{
"title": "Test Root Document",
},
)
assert response.status_code == 201
data = response.json()
document = models.Document.objects.get(id=data["id"])
assert document.title == "Test Root Document"
assert document.creator == user_specific_sub
assert document.accesses.filter(role="owner", user=user_specific_sub).exists()
def test_external_api_documents_create_subdocument_owner_success(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Users with an access token SHOULD BE able to create a sub-document through the resource
server when they have OWNER permissions on the parent document.
The creator is set to the authenticated user, and permissions are inherited
from the parent document.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
# Create a parent document first
parent_document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED,
creator=user_specific_sub,
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=parent_document,
user=user_specific_sub,
role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER,
)
response = client.post(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{parent_document.id}/children/",
{
"title": "Test Sub Document",
},
)
assert response.status_code == 201
data = response.json()
document = models.Document.objects.get(id=data["id"])
assert document.title == "Test Sub Document"
assert document.creator == user_specific_sub
assert document.get_parent() == parent_document
# Child documents inherit permissions from parent, no direct access needed
assert not document.accesses.exists()
def test_external_api_documents_create_subdocument_editor_success(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Users with an access token SHOULD BE able to create a sub-document through the resource
server when they have EDITOR permissions on the parent document.
Permissions are inherited from the parent document.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
# Create a parent document first
parent_document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED,
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=parent_document,
user=user_specific_sub,
role=models.RoleChoices.EDITOR,
)
response = client.post(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{parent_document.id}/children/",
{
"title": "Test Sub Document",
},
)
assert response.status_code == 201
data = response.json()
document = models.Document.objects.get(id=data["id"])
assert document.title == "Test Sub Document"
assert document.creator == user_specific_sub
assert document.get_parent() == parent_document
# Child documents inherit permissions from parent, no direct access needed
assert not document.accesses.exists()
def test_external_api_documents_create_subdocument_reader_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Users with an access token SHOULD NOT be able to create a sub-document through the resource
server when they have READER permissions on the parent document.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
# Create a parent document first
parent_document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED,
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=parent_document,
user=user_specific_sub,
role=models.RoleChoices.READER,
)
response = client.post(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{parent_document.id}/children/",
{
"title": "Test Sub Document",
},
)
assert response.status_code == 403
@patch("core.services.converter_services.Converter.convert")
def test_external_api_documents_create_with_markdown_file_success(
mock_convert, user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Users with an access token should be able to create documents through the resource
server by uploading a Markdown file and should automatically be declared as the owner
of the newly created document.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
# Mock the conversion
converted_yjs = "base64encodedyjscontent"
mock_convert.return_value = converted_yjs
# Create a fake Markdown file
file_content = b"# Test Document\n\nThis is a test."
file = BytesIO(file_content)
file.name = "readme.md"
response = client.post(
"/external_api/v1.0/documents/",
{
"file": file,
},
format="multipart",
)
assert response.status_code == 201
data = response.json()
document = models.Document.objects.get(id=data["id"])
assert document.title == "readme.md"
assert document.content == converted_yjs
assert document.accesses.filter(role="owner", user=user_specific_sub).exists()
# Verify the converter was called correctly
mock_convert.assert_called_once_with(
file_content,
content_type=mime_types.MARKDOWN,
accept=mime_types.YJS,
)
def test_external_api_documents_list_with_multiple_roles(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
List all documents accessible to a user with different roles and verify
that associated permissions are correctly returned in the response.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
# Create documents with different roles for the user
owner_document = factories.DocumentFactory(
title="Owner Document",
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED,
creator=user_specific_sub,
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=owner_document,
user=user_specific_sub,
role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER,
)
editor_document = factories.DocumentFactory(
title="Editor Document",
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED,
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=editor_document,
user=user_specific_sub,
role=models.RoleChoices.EDITOR,
)
reader_document = factories.DocumentFactory(
title="Reader Document",
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED,
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=reader_document,
user=user_specific_sub,
role=models.RoleChoices.READER,
)
# Create a document the user should NOT have access to
other_document = factories.DocumentFactory(
title="Other Document",
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED,
)
other_user = factories.UserFactory()
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=other_document,
user=other_user,
role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER,
)
response = client.get("/external_api/v1.0/documents/")
assert response.status_code == 200
data = response.json()
# Verify the response contains results
assert "results" in data
results = data["results"]
# Verify user can see exactly 3 documents (owner, editor, reader)
result_ids = {result["id"] for result in results}
assert len(results) == 3
assert str(owner_document.id) in result_ids
assert str(editor_document.id) in result_ids
assert str(reader_document.id) in result_ids
assert str(other_document.id) not in result_ids
# Verify each document has correct user_role field indicating permission level
for result in results:
if result["id"] == str(owner_document.id):
assert result["title"] == "Owner Document"
assert result["user_role"] == models.RoleChoices.OWNER
elif result["id"] == str(editor_document.id):
assert result["title"] == "Editor Document"
assert result["user_role"] == models.RoleChoices.EDITOR
elif result["id"] == str(reader_document.id):
assert result["title"] == "Reader Document"
assert result["user_role"] == models.RoleChoices.READER
def test_external_api_documents_duplicate_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users CAN DUPLICATE a document from a resource server
when they have the required permissions on the document,
as this action bypasses the permission checks.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED,
creator=user_specific_sub,
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document,
user=user_specific_sub,
role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER,
)
response = client.post(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/duplicate/",
)
assert response.status_code == 201
# NOT allowed actions on resource server.
def test_external_api_documents_put_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to PUT a document from a resource server.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED,
creator=user_specific_sub,
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document,
user=user_specific_sub,
role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER,
)
response = client.put(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/", {"title": "new title"}
)
assert response.status_code == 403
def test_external_api_document_delete_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to delete a document from a resource server.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED,
creator=user_specific_sub,
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document,
user=user_specific_sub,
role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER,
)
response = client.delete(f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/")
assert response.status_code == 403
def test_external_api_documents_move_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to MOVE a document from a resource server.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED,
creator=user_specific_sub,
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document,
user=user_specific_sub,
role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER,
)
new_parent = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED,
creator=user_specific_sub,
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=new_parent,
user=user_specific_sub,
role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER,
)
response = client.post(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/move/",
{"target_document_id": new_parent.id},
)
assert response.status_code == 403
def test_external_api_documents_restore_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to restore a document from a resource server.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED,
creator=user_specific_sub,
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document,
user=user_specific_sub,
role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER,
)
response = client.post(f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/restore/")
assert response.status_code == 403
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role", models.LinkRoleChoices.values)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("reach", models.LinkReachChoices.values)
def test_external_api_documents_trashbin_not_allowed(
role, reach, user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to list documents from the trashbin,
regardless of the document link reach and user role, from a resource server.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=reach,
creator=user_specific_sub,
deleted_at=timezone.now(),
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document,
user=user_specific_sub,
role=role,
)
response = client.get("/external_api/v1.0/documents/trashbin/")
assert response.status_code == 403
def test_external_api_documents_create_for_owner_not_allowed():
"""
Authenticated users SHOULD NOT be allowed to call create documents
on behalf of other users.
This API endpoint is reserved for server-to-server calls.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
data = {
"title": "My Document",
"content": "Document content",
"sub": "123",
"email": "john.doe@example.com",
}
response = client.post(
"/external_api/v1.0/documents/create-for-owner/",
data,
format="json",
)
assert response.status_code == 401
assert not models.Document.objects.exists()
# Test overrides
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": ["list", "retrieve", "children", "trashbin"],
},
}
)
def test_external_api_documents_trashbin_can_be_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD be allowed to list soft deleted documents from a resource server
when the trashbin action is enabled in EXTERNAL_API settings.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER
)
document.soft_delete()
response = client.get("/external_api/v1.0/documents/trashbin/")
assert response.status_code == 200
content = response.json()
results = content.pop("results")
assert content == {
"count": 1,
"next": None,
"previous": None,
}
assert len(results) == 1
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": ["list", "retrieve", "children", "destroy"],
},
}
)
def test_external_api_documents_delete_can_be_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD be allowed to delete a document from a resource server
when the delete action is enabled in EXTERNAL_API settings.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER
)
response = client.delete(f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/")
assert response.status_code == 204
# Verify the document is soft deleted
document.refresh_from_db()
assert document.deleted_at is not None
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
"update",
],
},
}
)
def test_external_api_documents_update_can_be_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD be allowed to update a document from a resource server
when the update action is enabled in EXTERNAL_API settings.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER
)
original_title = document.title
response = client.put(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/", {"title": "new title"}
)
assert response.status_code == 200
# Verify the document is updated
document.refresh_from_db()
assert document.title == "new title"
assert document.title != original_title
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": ["list", "retrieve", "children", "move"],
},
}
)
def test_external_api_documents_move_can_be_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD be allowed to move a document from a resource server
when the move action is enabled in EXTERNAL_API settings and they
have the required permissions on the document and the target location.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
parent = factories.DocumentFactory(
users=[(user_specific_sub, "owner")], teams=[("lasuite", "owner")]
)
# A document with no owner
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
parent=parent, users=[(user_specific_sub, "reader")]
)
target = factories.DocumentFactory()
response = client.post(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/move/",
data={"target_document_id": str(target.id), "position": "first-sibling"},
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {"message": "Document moved successfully."}
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": ["list", "retrieve", "children", "restore"],
},
}
)
def test_external_api_documents_restore_can_be_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD be allowed to restore a recently soft-deleted document
from a resource server when the restore action is enabled in EXTERNAL_API
settings and they have the required permissions on the document.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
now = timezone.now() - timedelta(days=15)
document = factories.DocumentFactory(deleted_at=now)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role="owner"
)
response = client.post(f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/restore/")
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {"detail": "Document has been successfully restored."}
document.refresh_from_db()
assert document.deleted_at is None
assert document.ancestors_deleted_at is None

View file

@ -0,0 +1,681 @@
"""
Tests for the Resource Server API for documents accesses.
Not testing external API endpoints that are already tested in the /api
because the resource server viewsets inherit from the api viewsets.
"""
from django.test import override_settings
import pytest
import responses
from rest_framework.test import APIClient
from core import factories, models
from core.api import serializers
from core.tests.utils.urls import reload_urls
pytestmark = pytest.mark.django_db
# pylint: disable=unused-argument
def test_external_api_document_accesses_anonymous_public_standalone():
"""
Anonymous users SHOULD NOT be allowed to list document accesses
from external API if resource server is not enabled.
"""
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED,
)
response = APIClient().get(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/"
)
assert response.status_code == 404
def test_external_api_document_accesses_list_connected_not_resource_server():
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to list document accesses
if resource server is not enabled.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED)
response = APIClient().get(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/"
)
assert response.status_code == 404
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
],
},
"document_access": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [],
},
}
)
def test_external_api_document_accesses_list_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to list the accesses of
a document from a resource server.
"""
reload_urls()
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED,
creator=user_specific_sub,
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document,
user=user_specific_sub,
role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER,
)
response = client.get(f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/")
assert response.status_code == 403
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
],
},
"document_access": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [],
},
}
)
def test_external_api_document_accesses_retrieve_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to retrieve a specific access of
a document from a resource server.
"""
reload_urls()
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED,
creator=user_specific_sub,
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document,
user=user_specific_sub,
role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER,
)
access = factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(document=document)
response = client.get(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/{access.id!s}/"
)
assert response.status_code == 403
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
],
},
"document_access": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [],
},
}
)
def test_external_api_documents_accesses_create_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to create an access for a document
from a resource server.
"""
reload_urls()
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED,
creator=user_specific_sub,
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document,
user=user_specific_sub,
role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER,
)
other_user = factories.UserFactory()
response = client.post(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/",
{"user_id": other_user.id, "role": models.RoleChoices.READER},
)
assert response.status_code == 403
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
],
},
"document_access": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [],
},
}
)
def test_external_api_document_accesses_update_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to update an access for a
document from a resource server through PUT.
"""
reload_urls()
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED,
creator=user_specific_sub,
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document,
user=user_specific_sub,
role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER,
)
other_user = factories.UserFactory()
access = factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=other_user, role=models.RoleChoices.READER
)
response = client.put(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/{access.id!s}/",
{"role": models.RoleChoices.EDITOR},
)
assert response.status_code == 403
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
],
},
"document_access": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [],
},
}
)
def test_external_api_document_accesses_partial_update_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to update an access
for a document from a resource server through PATCH.
"""
reload_urls()
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED,
creator=user_specific_sub,
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document,
user=user_specific_sub,
role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER,
)
other_user = factories.UserFactory()
access = factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=other_user, role=models.RoleChoices.READER
)
response = client.patch(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/{access.id!s}/",
{"role": models.RoleChoices.EDITOR},
)
assert response.status_code == 403
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
],
},
"document_access": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [],
},
}
)
def test_external_api_documents_accesses_delete_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to delete an access for
a document from a resource server.
"""
reload_urls()
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED,
creator=user_specific_sub,
)
access = factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document,
user=user_specific_sub,
role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER,
)
response = client.delete(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/{access.id!s}/",
)
assert response.status_code == 403
# Overrides
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
],
},
"document_access": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": ["list", "retrieve"],
},
}
)
def test_external_api_document_accesses_list_can_be_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD be allowed to list the accesses of a document from a resource server
when the list action is enabled in EXTERNAL_API document_access settings.
"""
reload_urls()
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED, creator=user_specific_sub
)
user_access = factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER
)
# Create additional accesses
other_user = factories.UserFactory()
other_access = factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=other_user, role=models.RoleChoices.READER
)
response = client.get(f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/")
assert response.status_code == 200
data = response.json()
access_ids = [entry["id"] for entry in data]
assert str(user_access.id) in access_ids
assert str(other_access.id) in access_ids
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
],
},
"document_access": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": ["list", "retrieve"],
},
}
)
def test_external_api_document_accesses_retrieve_can_be_allowed(
user_token,
resource_server_backend,
user_specific_sub,
):
"""
A user who is related to a document SHOULD be allowed to retrieve the
associated document user accesses.
"""
reload_urls()
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory()
access = factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER
)
response = client.get(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/{access.id!s}/",
)
data = response.json()
assert response.status_code == 200
assert data["id"] == str(access.id)
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
],
},
"document_access": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": ["list", "create"],
},
}
)
def test_external_api_document_accesses_create_can_be_allowed(
user_token,
resource_server_backend,
user_specific_sub,
):
"""
A user who is related to a document SHOULD be allowed to create
a user access for the document.
"""
reload_urls()
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory()
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER
)
other_user = factories.UserFactory()
response = client.post(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/",
data={"user_id": other_user.id, "role": models.RoleChoices.READER},
)
data = response.json()
assert response.status_code == 201
assert data["role"] == models.RoleChoices.READER
assert str(data["user"]["id"]) == str(other_user.id)
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
],
},
"document_access": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": ["list", "update"],
},
}
)
def test_external_api_document_accesses_update_can_be_allowed(
user_token,
resource_server_backend,
user_specific_sub,
settings,
):
"""
A user who is related to a document SHOULD be allowed to update
a user access for the document through PUT.
"""
reload_urls()
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory()
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER
)
other_user = factories.UserFactory()
access = factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=other_user, role=models.RoleChoices.READER
)
# Add the reset-connections endpoint to the existing mock
settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL = "http://example.com/"
settings.COLLABORATION_SERVER_SECRET = "secret-token"
endpoint_url = (
f"{settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL}reset-connections/?room={document.id}"
)
resource_server_backend.add(
responses.POST,
endpoint_url,
json={},
status=200,
)
old_values = serializers.DocumentAccessSerializer(instance=access).data
# Update only the role field
response = client.put(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/{access.id!s}/",
{**old_values, "role": models.RoleChoices.EDITOR}, #  type: ignore
format="json",
)
assert response.status_code == 200
data = response.json()
assert data["role"] == models.RoleChoices.EDITOR
assert str(data["user"]["id"]) == str(other_user.id)
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
],
},
"document_access": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": ["list", "partial_update"],
},
}
)
def test_external_api_document_accesses_partial_update_can_be_allowed(
user_token,
resource_server_backend,
user_specific_sub,
settings,
):
"""
A user who is related to a document SHOULD be allowed to update
a user access for the document through PATCH.
"""
reload_urls()
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory()
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER
)
other_user = factories.UserFactory()
access = factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=other_user, role=models.RoleChoices.READER
)
# Add the reset-connections endpoint to the existing mock
settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL = "http://example.com/"
settings.COLLABORATION_SERVER_SECRET = "secret-token"
endpoint_url = (
f"{settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL}reset-connections/?room={document.id}"
)
resource_server_backend.add(
responses.POST,
endpoint_url,
json={},
status=200,
)
response = client.patch(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/{access.id!s}/",
data={"role": models.RoleChoices.EDITOR},
)
data = response.json()
assert response.status_code == 200
assert data["role"] == models.RoleChoices.EDITOR
assert str(data["user"]["id"]) == str(other_user.id)
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
],
},
"document_access": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": ["list", "destroy"],
},
}
)
def test_external_api_documents_accesses_delete_can_be_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub, settings
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD be allowed to delete an access for
a document from a resource server when the destroy action is
enabled in settings.
"""
reload_urls()
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED,
creator=user_specific_sub,
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document,
user=user_specific_sub,
role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER,
)
other_user = factories.UserFactory()
other_access = factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=other_user, role=models.RoleChoices.READER
)
# Add the reset-connections endpoint to the existing mock
settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL = "http://example.com/"
settings.COLLABORATION_SERVER_SECRET = "secret-token"
endpoint_url = (
f"{settings.COLLABORATION_API_URL}reset-connections/?room={document.id}"
)
resource_server_backend.add(
responses.POST,
endpoint_url,
json={},
status=200,
)
response = client.delete(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/accesses/{other_access.id!s}/",
)
assert response.status_code == 204

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"""
Tests for the Resource Server API for document AI features.
Not testing external API endpoints that are already tested in the /api
because the resource server viewsets inherit from the api viewsets.
"""
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
from django.test import override_settings
import pytest
from rest_framework.test import APIClient
from core import factories, models
from core.tests.documents.test_api_documents_ai_proxy import ( # pylint: disable=unused-import
ai_settings,
)
pytestmark = pytest.mark.django_db
# pylint: disable=unused-argument
def test_external_api_documents_ai_transform_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to access AI transform endpoints
from a resource server by default.
"""
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED,
creator=user_specific_sub,
)
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
response = client.post(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/ai-transform/",
{"text": "hello", "action": "prompt"},
)
assert response.status_code == 403
assert response.json() == {
"detail": "You do not have permission to perform this action."
}
def test_external_api_documents_ai_translate_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to access AI translate endpoints
from a resource server by default.
"""
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED,
creator=user_specific_sub,
)
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
response = client.post(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/ai-translate/",
{"text": "hello", "language": "es"},
)
assert response.status_code == 403
assert response.json() == {
"detail": "You do not have permission to perform this action."
}
def test_external_api_documents_ai_proxy_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to access AI proxy endpoints
from a resource server by default.
"""
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED,
creator=user_specific_sub,
)
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
response = client.post(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/ai-proxy/",
b"{}",
content_type="application/json",
)
assert response.status_code == 403
assert response.json() == {
"detail": "You do not have permission to perform this action."
}
# Overrides
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
"ai_transform",
],
},
}
)
@pytest.mark.usefixtures("ai_settings")
@patch("openai.resources.chat.completions.Completions.create")
def test_external_api_documents_ai_transform_can_be_allowed(
mock_create, user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Users SHOULD be allowed to transform a document using AI when the
corresponding action is enabled via EXTERNAL_API settings.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED, favorited_by=[user_specific_sub]
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER
)
mock_create.return_value = MagicMock(
choices=[MagicMock(message=MagicMock(content="Salut"))]
)
url = f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/ai-transform/"
response = client.post(url, {"text": "Hello", "action": "prompt"})
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {"answer": "Salut"}
# pylint: disable=line-too-long
mock_create.assert_called_once_with(
model="llama",
messages=[
{
"role": "system",
"content": (
"Answer the prompt using markdown formatting for structure and emphasis. "
"Return the content directly without wrapping it in code blocks or markdown delimiters. "
"Preserve the language and markdown formatting. "
"Do not provide any other information. "
"Preserve the language."
),
},
{"role": "user", "content": "Hello"},
],
)
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
"ai_translate",
],
},
}
)
@pytest.mark.usefixtures("ai_settings")
@patch("openai.resources.chat.completions.Completions.create")
def test_external_api_documents_ai_translate_can_be_allowed(
mock_create, user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Users SHOULD be allowed to translate a document using AI when the
corresponding action is enabled via EXTERNAL_API settings.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED, favorited_by=[user_specific_sub]
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER
)
mock_create.return_value = MagicMock(
choices=[MagicMock(message=MagicMock(content="Salut"))]
)
url = f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/ai-translate/"
response = client.post(url, {"text": "Hello", "language": "es-co"})
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {"answer": "Salut"}
mock_create.assert_called_once_with(
model="llama",
messages=[
{
"role": "system",
"content": (
"Keep the same html structure and formatting. "
"Translate the content in the html to the "
"specified language Colombian Spanish. "
"Check the translation for accuracy and make any necessary corrections. "
"Do not provide any other information."
),
},
{"role": "user", "content": "Hello"},
],
)
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
"ai_proxy",
],
},
}
)
@pytest.mark.usefixtures("ai_settings")
@patch("core.services.ai_services.AIService.stream")
def test_external_api_documents_ai_proxy_can_be_allowed(
mock_stream, user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Users SHOULD be allowed to use the AI proxy endpoint when the
corresponding action is enabled via EXTERNAL_API settings.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED, creator=user_specific_sub
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER
)
mock_stream.return_value = iter(["data: response\n"])
url = f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/ai-proxy/"
response = client.post(
url,
b"{}",
content_type="application/json",
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response["Content-Type"] == "text/event-stream" # type: ignore
mock_stream.assert_called_once()

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"""
Tests for the Resource Server API for document attachments.
Not testing external API endpoints that are already tested in the /api
because the resource server viewsets inherit from the api viewsets.
"""
import re
import uuid
from urllib.parse import parse_qs, urlparse
from django.core.files.uploadedfile import SimpleUploadedFile
from django.test import override_settings
import pytest
from rest_framework.test import APIClient
from core import factories, models
pytestmark = pytest.mark.django_db
# pylint: disable=unused-argument
def test_external_api_documents_attachment_upload_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to upload attachments to a document
from a resource server.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
pixel = (
b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n\x00\x00\x00\rIHDR\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x01\x08\x06\x00"
b"\x00\x00\x1f\x15\xc4\x89\x00\x00\x00\nIDATx\x9cc\xf8\xff\xff?\x00\x05\xfe\x02\xfe"
b"\xa7V\xbd\xfa\x00\x00\x00\x00IEND\xaeB`\x82"
)
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED,
creator=user_specific_sub,
)
file = SimpleUploadedFile(name="test.png", content=pixel, content_type="image/png")
response = client.post(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/attachment-upload/",
{"file": file},
format="multipart",
)
assert response.status_code == 403
assert response.json() == {
"detail": "You do not have permission to perform this action."
}
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
"attachment_upload",
],
},
}
)
def test_external_api_documents_attachment_upload_can_be_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD be allowed to upload attachments to a document
from a resource server when the attachment-upload action is enabled in EXTERNAL_API settings.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
pixel = (
b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n\x00\x00\x00\rIHDR\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x01\x08\x06\x00"
b"\x00\x00\x1f\x15\xc4\x89\x00\x00\x00\nIDATx\x9cc\xf8\xff\xff?\x00\x05\xfe\x02\xfe"
b"\xa7V\xbd\xfa\x00\x00\x00\x00IEND\xaeB`\x82"
)
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED,
creator=user_specific_sub,
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document,
user=user_specific_sub,
role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER,
)
file = SimpleUploadedFile(name="test.png", content=pixel, content_type="image/png")
response = client.post(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/attachment-upload/",
{"file": file},
format="multipart",
)
assert response.status_code == 201
pattern = re.compile(rf"^{document.id!s}/attachments/(.*)\.png")
url_parsed = urlparse(response.json()["file"])
assert url_parsed.path == f"/api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/media-check/"
query = parse_qs(url_parsed.query)
assert query["key"][0] is not None
file_path = query["key"][0]
match = pattern.search(file_path)
file_id = match.group(1) # type: ignore
# Validate that file_id is a valid UUID
uuid.UUID(file_id)

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"""
Tests for the Resource Server API for document favorites.
Not testing external API endpoints that are already tested in the /api
because the resource server viewsets inherit from the api viewsets.
"""
from django.test import override_settings
import pytest
from rest_framework.test import APIClient
from core import factories, models
pytestmark = pytest.mark.django_db
# pylint: disable=unused-argument
def test_external_api_documents_favorites_list_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD be allowed to list their favorites
from a resource server, as favorite_list() bypasses permissions.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
user=user_specific_sub,
role=models.RoleChoices.READER,
document__favorited_by=[user_specific_sub],
).document
response = client.get("/external_api/v1.0/documents/favorite_list/")
assert response.status_code == 200
data = response.json()
assert data["count"] == 1
assert data["results"][0]["id"] == str(document.id)
def test_external_api_documents_favorite_add_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
By default the "favorite" action is not permitted on the external API.
POST to the endpoint must return 403.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER
)
response = client.post(f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/favorite/")
assert response.status_code == 403
def test_external_api_documents_favorite_delete_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
By default the "favorite" action is not permitted on the external API.
DELETE to the endpoint must return 403.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER
)
response = client.delete(f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/favorite/")
assert response.status_code == 403
# Overrides
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
"favorite",
],
},
}
)
def test_external_api_documents_favorite_add_can_be_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Users SHOULD be allowed to POST to the favorite endpoint when the
corresponding action is enabled via EXTERNAL_API settings.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER
)
response = client.post(f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/favorite/")
assert response.status_code == 201
assert models.DocumentFavorite.objects.filter(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub
).exists()
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
"favorite",
],
},
}
)
def test_external_api_documents_favorite_delete_can_be_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Users SHOULD be allowed to DELETE from the favorite endpoint when the
corresponding action is enabled via EXTERNAL_API settings.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED, favorited_by=[user_specific_sub]
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER
)
response = client.delete(f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/favorite/")
assert response.status_code == 204
assert not models.DocumentFavorite.objects.filter(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub
).exists()

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"""
Tests for the Resource Server API for invitations.
Not testing external API endpoints that are already tested in the /api
because the resource server viewsets inherit from the api viewsets.
"""
from django.test import override_settings
import pytest
from rest_framework.test import APIClient
from core import factories, models
from core.tests.utils.urls import reload_urls
pytestmark = pytest.mark.django_db
# pylint: disable=unused-argument
def test_external_api_document_invitations_anonymous_public_standalone():
"""
Anonymous users SHOULD NOT be allowed to list invitations from external
API if resource server is not enabled.
"""
invitation = factories.InvitationFactory()
response = APIClient().get(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{invitation.document.id!s}/invitations/"
)
assert response.status_code == 404
def test_external_api_document_invitations_list_connected_not_resource_server():
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to list document invitations
if resource server is not enabled.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
invitation = factories.InvitationFactory()
response = APIClient().get(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{invitation.document.id!s}/invitations/"
)
assert response.status_code == 404
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
],
},
"document_invitation": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [],
},
},
)
def test_external_api_document_invitations_list_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to list document invitations
by default.
"""
reload_urls()
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
invitation = factories.InvitationFactory()
response = client.get(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{invitation.document.id!s}/invitations/"
)
assert response.status_code == 403
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
],
},
"document_invitation": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [],
},
},
)
def test_external_api_document_invitations_retrieve_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to retrieve a document invitation
by default.
"""
reload_urls()
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
invitation = factories.InvitationFactory()
document = invitation.document
response = client.get(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/invitations/{invitation.id!s}/"
)
assert response.status_code == 403
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
],
},
"document_invitation": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [],
},
},
)
def test_external_api_document_invitations_create_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to create a document invitation
by default.
"""
reload_urls()
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory()
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER
)
response = client.post(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/invitations/",
{"email": "invited@example.com", "role": models.RoleChoices.READER},
format="json",
)
assert response.status_code == 403
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
],
},
"document_invitation": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": ["list", "retrieve"],
},
},
)
def test_external_api_document_invitations_partial_update_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to partially update a document invitation
by default.
"""
reload_urls()
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory()
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER
)
invitation = factories.InvitationFactory(
document=document, role=models.RoleChoices.READER
)
response = client.patch(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/invitations/{invitation.id!s}/",
{"role": models.RoleChoices.EDITOR},
format="json",
)
assert response.status_code == 403
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
],
},
"document_invitation": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": ["list", "retrieve"],
},
},
)
def test_external_api_document_invitations_delete_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to delete a document invitation
by default.
"""
reload_urls()
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory()
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER
)
invitation = factories.InvitationFactory(document=document)
response = client.delete(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/invitations/{invitation.id!s}/",
)
assert response.status_code == 403
# Overrides
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
],
},
"document_invitation": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": ["list", "retrieve"],
},
},
)
def test_external_api_document_invitations_list_can_be_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD be allowed to list document invitations
when the action is explicitly enabled.
"""
reload_urls()
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory()
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER
)
invitation = factories.InvitationFactory(document=document)
response = client.get(f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/invitations/")
assert response.status_code == 200
data = response.json()
assert data["count"] == 1
assert data["results"][0]["id"] == str(invitation.id)
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
],
},
"document_invitation": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": ["list", "retrieve"],
},
},
)
def test_external_api_document_invitations_retrieve_can_be_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD be allowed to retrieve a document invitation
when the action is explicitly enabled.
"""
reload_urls()
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory()
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER
)
invitation = factories.InvitationFactory(document=document)
response = client.get(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/invitations/{invitation.id!s}/"
)
assert response.status_code == 200
data = response.json()
assert data["id"] == str(invitation.id)
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
],
},
"document_invitation": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": ["list", "retrieve", "create"],
},
},
)
def test_external_api_document_invitations_create_can_be_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD be allowed to create a document invitation
when the create action is explicitly enabled.
"""
reload_urls()
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory()
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER
)
response = client.post(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/invitations/",
{"email": "invited@example.com", "role": models.RoleChoices.READER},
format="json",
)
assert response.status_code == 201
data = response.json()
assert data["email"] == "invited@example.com"
assert data["role"] == models.RoleChoices.READER
assert str(data["document"]) == str(document.id)
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
],
},
"document_invitation": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": ["list", "retrieve", "partial_update"],
},
},
)
def test_external_api_document_invitations_partial_update_can_be_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD be allowed to partially update a document invitation
when the partial_update action is explicitly enabled.
"""
reload_urls()
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory()
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER
)
invitation = factories.InvitationFactory(
document=document, role=models.RoleChoices.READER
)
response = client.patch(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/invitations/{invitation.id!s}/",
{"role": models.RoleChoices.EDITOR},
format="json",
)
assert response.status_code == 200
data = response.json()
assert data["role"] == models.RoleChoices.EDITOR
assert data["email"] == invitation.email
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
],
},
"document_invitation": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": ["list", "retrieve", "destroy"],
},
},
)
def test_external_api_document_invitations_delete_can_be_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD be allowed to delete a document invitation
when the destroy action is explicitly enabled.
"""
reload_urls()
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory()
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER
)
invitation = factories.InvitationFactory(document=document)
response = client.delete(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/invitations/{invitation.id!s}/",
)
assert response.status_code == 204

View file

@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
"""
Tests for the Resource Server API for document link configurations.
Not testing external API endpoints that are already tested in the /api
because the resource server viewsets inherit from the api viewsets.
"""
from unittest.mock import patch
from django.test import override_settings
import pytest
from rest_framework.test import APIClient
from core import factories, models
pytestmark = pytest.mark.django_db
# pylint: disable=unused-argument
def test_external_api_documents_link_configuration_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to update the link configuration of a document
from a resource server.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED,
creator=user_specific_sub,
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document,
user=user_specific_sub,
role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER,
)
response = client.put(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/link-configuration/"
)
assert response.status_code == 403
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
"link_configuration",
],
},
},
COLLABORATION_API_URL="http://example.com/",
COLLABORATION_SERVER_SECRET="secret-token",
)
@patch("core.services.collaboration_services.CollaborationService.reset_connections")
def test_external_api_documents_link_configuration_can_be_allowed(
mock_reset, user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD be allowed to update the link configuration of a document
from a resource server when the corresponding action is enabled in EXTERNAL_API settings.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED,
creator=user_specific_sub,
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document,
user=user_specific_sub,
role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER,
)
# attempt to change reach/role to a valid combination
new_data = {
"link_reach": models.LinkReachChoices.PUBLIC,
"link_role": models.LinkRoleChoices.EDITOR,
}
response = client.put(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/link-configuration/",
new_data,
format="json",
)
assert response.status_code == 200
# verify the document was updated in the database
document.refresh_from_db()
assert document.link_reach == models.LinkReachChoices.PUBLIC
assert document.link_role == models.LinkRoleChoices.EDITOR

View file

@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
"""
Tests for the Resource Server API for document media authentication.
Not testing external API endpoints that are already tested in the /api
because the resource server viewsets inherit from the api viewsets.
"""
from io import BytesIO
from uuid import uuid4
from django.core.files.storage import default_storage
from django.test import override_settings
from django.utils import timezone
import pytest
from freezegun import freeze_time
from rest_framework.test import APIClient
from core import factories, models
from core.enums import DocumentAttachmentStatus
pytestmark = pytest.mark.django_db
# pylint: disable=unused-argument
def test_external_api_documents_media_auth_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to access media auth endpoints
from a resource server by default.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
response = client.get("/external_api/v1.0/documents/media-auth/")
assert response.status_code == 403
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
"media_auth",
],
},
}
)
def test_external_api_documents_media_auth_can_be_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD be allowed to access media auth endpoints
from a resource server when the media-auth action is enabled in EXTERNAL_API settings.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document_id = uuid4()
filename = f"{uuid4()!s}.jpg"
key = f"{document_id!s}/attachments/{filename:s}"
media_url = f"http://localhost/media/{key:s}"
default_storage.connection.meta.client.put_object(
Bucket=default_storage.bucket_name,
Key=key,
Body=BytesIO(b"my prose"),
ContentType="text/plain",
Metadata={"status": DocumentAttachmentStatus.READY},
)
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
id=document_id, link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED, attachments=[key]
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role=models.RoleChoices.READER
)
now = timezone.now()
with freeze_time(now):
response = client.get(
"/external_api/v1.0/documents/media-auth/", HTTP_X_ORIGINAL_URL=media_url
)
assert response.status_code == 200

View file

@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
"""
Tests for the Resource Server API for document versions.
Not testing external API endpoints that are already tested in the /api
because the resource server viewsets inherit from the api viewsets.
"""
import time
from django.test import override_settings
import pytest
from rest_framework.test import APIClient
from core import factories, models
pytestmark = pytest.mark.django_db
# pylint: disable=unused-argument
def test_external_api_documents_versions_list_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to list the versions of a document
from a resource server by default.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(
link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED,
creator=user_specific_sub,
)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document,
user=user_specific_sub,
role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER,
)
response = client.get(f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/versions/")
assert response.status_code == 403
def test_external_api_documents_versions_detail_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to retrieve a specific version of a document
from a resource server by default.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER
)
response = client.get(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/versions/1234/"
)
assert response.status_code == 403
# Overrides
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": ["list", "retrieve", "children", "versions_list"],
},
}
)
def test_external_api_documents_versions_list_can_be_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD be allowed to list version of a document from a resource server
when the versions action is enabled in EXTERNAL_API settings.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER
)
# Add new versions to the document
for i in range(3):
document.content = f"new content {i:d}"
document.save()
response = client.get(f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/versions/")
assert response.status_code == 200
content = response.json()
assert content["count"] == 2
@override_settings(
EXTERNAL_API={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"children",
"versions_list",
"versions_detail",
],
},
}
)
def test_external_api_documents_versions_detail_can_be_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD be allowed to retrieve a specific version of a document
from a resource server when the versions_detail action is enabled.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
document = factories.DocumentFactory(link_reach=models.LinkReachChoices.RESTRICTED)
factories.UserDocumentAccessFactory(
document=document, user=user_specific_sub, role=models.RoleChoices.OWNER
)
# ensure access datetime is earlier than versions (minio precision is one second)
time.sleep(1)
# create several versions, spacing them out to get distinct LastModified values
for i in range(3):
document.content = f"new content {i:d}"
document.save()
time.sleep(1)
# call the list endpoint and verify basic structure
response = client.get(f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/versions/")
assert response.status_code == 200
content = response.json()
# count should reflect two saved versions beyond the original
assert content.get("count") == 2
# pick the first version returned by the list (should be accessible)
version_id = content.get("versions")[0]["version_id"]
detailed_response = client.get(
f"/external_api/v1.0/documents/{document.id!s}/versions/{version_id}/"
)
assert detailed_response.status_code == 200
assert detailed_response.json()["content"] == "new content 1"

View file

@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
"""
Tests for the Resource Server API for users.
Not testing external API endpoints that are already tested in the /api
because the resource server viewsets inherit from the api viewsets.
"""
import pytest
from rest_framework.test import APIClient
from core import factories
from core.api import serializers
from core.tests.utils.urls import reload_urls
pytestmark = pytest.mark.django_db
# pylint: disable=unused-argument
def test_external_api_users_me_anonymous_public_standalone():
"""
Anonymous users SHOULD NOT be allowed to retrieve their own user information from external
API if resource server is not enabled.
"""
reload_urls()
response = APIClient().get("/external_api/v1.0/users/me/")
assert response.status_code == 404
def test_external_api_users_me_connected_not_allowed():
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to retrieve their own user information from external
API if resource server is not enabled.
"""
reload_urls()
user = factories.UserFactory()
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
response = client.get("/external_api/v1.0/users/me/")
assert response.status_code == 404
def test_external_api_users_me_connected_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD be allowed to retrieve their own user information from external API
if resource server is enabled.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
response = client.get("/external_api/v1.0/users/me/")
assert response.status_code == 200
data = response.json()
assert data["id"] == str(user_specific_sub.id)
assert data["email"] == user_specific_sub.email
def test_external_api_users_me_connected_with_invalid_token_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to retrieve their own user information from external API
if resource server is enabled with an invalid token.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
response = client.get("/external_api/v1.0/users/me/")
assert response.status_code == 401
# Non allowed actions on resource server.
def test_external_api_users_list_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to list users from a resource server.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
response = client.get("/external_api/v1.0/users/")
assert response.status_code == 403
def test_external_api_users_retrieve_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to retrieve a specific user from a resource server.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
other_user = factories.UserFactory()
response = client.get(f"/external_api/v1.0/users/{other_user.id!s}/")
assert response.status_code == 403
def test_external_api_users_put_patch_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to update or patch a user from a resource server.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
other_user = factories.UserFactory()
new_user_values = {
k: v
for k, v in serializers.UserSerializer(
instance=factories.UserFactory()
).data.items()
if v is not None
}
response = client.put(
f"/external_api/v1.0/users/{other_user.id!s}/", new_user_values
)
assert response.status_code == 403
response = client.patch(
f"/external_api/v1.0/users/{other_user.id!s}/",
{"email": "new_email@example.com"},
)
assert response.status_code == 403
def test_external_api_users_delete_not_allowed(
user_token, resource_server_backend, user_specific_sub
):
"""
Connected users SHOULD NOT be allowed to delete a user from a resource server.
"""
client = APIClient()
client.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Bearer {user_token}")
other_user = factories.UserFactory()
response = client.delete(f"/external_api/v1.0/users/{other_user.id!s}/")
assert response.status_code == 403

View file

@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ def test_api_users_list_query_email():
Only results with a Levenstein distance less than 3 with the query should be returned.
We want to match by Levenstein distance because we want to prevent typing errors.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory()
user = factories.UserFactory(email="user@example.com", full_name="Example User")
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ def test_api_users_list_query_email_with_internationalized_domain_names():
Authenticated users should be able to list users and filter by email.
It should work even if the email address contains an internationalized domain name.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory()
user = factories.UserFactory(email="user@example.com", full_name="Example User")
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ def test_api_users_list_query_full_name():
Authenticated users should be able to list users and filter by full name.
Only results with a Trigram similarity greater than 0.2 with the query should be returned.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory(email="user@example.com")
user = factories.UserFactory(email="user@example.com", full_name="Example User")
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ def test_api_users_list_query_accented_full_name():
Authenticated users should be able to list users and filter by full name with accents.
Only results with a Trigram similarity greater than 0.2 with the query should be returned.
"""
user = factories.UserFactory(email="user@example.com")
user = factories.UserFactory(email="user@example.com", full_name="Example User")
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)
@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ def test_api_users_list_query_long_queries():
def test_api_users_list_query_inactive():
"""Inactive users should not be listed."""
user = factories.UserFactory(email="user@example.com")
user = factories.UserFactory(email="user@example.com", full_name="Example User")
client = APIClient()
client.force_login(user)

View file

@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
"""Utils for testing URLs."""
import importlib
from django.urls import clear_url_caches
def reload_urls():
"""
Reload the URLs. Since the URLs are loaded based on a
settings value, we need to reload them to make the
URL settings based condition effective.
"""
import core.urls # pylint:disable=import-outside-toplevel # noqa: PLC0415
import impress.urls # pylint:disable=import-outside-toplevel # noqa: PLC0415
importlib.reload(core.urls)
importlib.reload(impress.urls)
clear_url_caches()

View file

@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ from lasuite.oidc_login.urls import urlpatterns as oidc_urls
from rest_framework.routers import DefaultRouter
from core.api import viewsets
from core.external_api import viewsets as external_api_viewsets
# - Main endpoints
router = DefaultRouter()
@ -43,6 +44,19 @@ thread_related_router.register(
basename="comments",
)
# - Resource server routes
external_api_router = DefaultRouter()
external_api_router.register(
"documents",
external_api_viewsets.ResourceServerDocumentViewSet,
basename="resource_server_documents",
)
external_api_router.register(
"users",
external_api_viewsets.ResourceServerUserViewSet,
basename="resource_server_users",
)
urlpatterns = [
path(
@ -68,3 +82,38 @@ urlpatterns = [
),
path(f"api/{settings.API_VERSION}/config/", viewsets.ConfigView.as_view()),
]
if settings.OIDC_RESOURCE_SERVER_ENABLED:
# - Routes nested under a document in external API
external_api_document_related_router = DefaultRouter()
document_access_config = settings.EXTERNAL_API.get("document_access", {})
if document_access_config.get("enabled", False):
external_api_document_related_router.register(
"accesses",
external_api_viewsets.ResourceServerDocumentAccessViewSet,
basename="resource_server_document_accesses",
)
document_invitation_config = settings.EXTERNAL_API.get("document_invitation", {})
if document_invitation_config.get("enabled", False):
external_api_document_related_router.register(
"invitations",
external_api_viewsets.ResourceServerInvitationViewSet,
basename="resource_server_document_invitations",
)
urlpatterns.append(
path(
f"external_api/{settings.API_VERSION}/",
include(
[
*external_api_router.urls,
re_path(
r"^documents/(?P<resource_id>[0-9a-z-]*)/",
include(external_api_document_related_router.urls),
),
]
),
)
)

View file

@ -687,6 +687,109 @@ class Base(Configuration):
environ_prefix=None,
)
# OIDC Resource Server
OIDC_RESOURCE_SERVER_ENABLED = values.BooleanValue(
default=False, environ_name="OIDC_RESOURCE_SERVER_ENABLED", environ_prefix=None
)
OIDC_RS_BACKEND_CLASS = values.Value(
"lasuite.oidc_resource_server.backend.ResourceServerBackend",
environ_name="OIDC_RS_BACKEND_CLASS",
environ_prefix=None,
)
OIDC_OP_URL = values.Value(None, environ_name="OIDC_OP_URL", environ_prefix=None)
OIDC_VERIFY_SSL = values.BooleanValue(
default=True, environ_name="OIDC_VERIFY_SSL", environ_prefix=None
)
OIDC_TIMEOUT = values.PositiveIntegerValue(
3, environ_name="OIDC_TIMEOUT", environ_prefix=None
)
OIDC_PROXY = values.Value(None, environ_name="OIDC_PROXY", environ_prefix=None)
OIDC_OP_INTROSPECTION_ENDPOINT = values.Value(
None, environ_name="OIDC_OP_INTROSPECTION_ENDPOINT", environ_prefix=None
)
OIDC_RS_CLIENT_ID = values.Value(
None, environ_name="OIDC_RS_CLIENT_ID", environ_prefix=None
)
OIDC_RS_CLIENT_SECRET = values.Value(
None, environ_name="OIDC_RS_CLIENT_SECRET", environ_prefix=None
)
OIDC_RS_AUDIENCE_CLAIM = values.Value(
"client_id", environ_name="OIDC_RS_AUDIENCE_CLAIM", environ_prefix=None
)
OIDC_RS_ENCRYPTION_ENCODING = values.Value(
"A256GCM", environ_name="OIDC_RS_ENCRYPTION_ENCODING", environ_prefix=None
)
OIDC_RS_ENCRYPTION_ALGO = values.Value(
"RSA-OAEP", environ_name="OIDC_RS_ENCRYPTION_ALGO", environ_prefix=None
)
OIDC_RS_SIGNING_ALGO = values.Value(
"ES256", environ_name="OIDC_RS_SIGNING_ALGO", environ_prefix=None
)
OIDC_RS_SCOPES = values.ListValue(
["openid"], environ_name="OIDC_RS_SCOPES", environ_prefix=None
)
OIDC_RS_ALLOWED_AUDIENCES = values.ListValue(
default=[],
environ_name="OIDC_RS_ALLOWED_AUDIENCES",
environ_prefix=None,
)
OIDC_RS_PRIVATE_KEY_STR = values.Value(
default=None,
environ_name="OIDC_RS_PRIVATE_KEY_STR",
environ_prefix=None,
)
OIDC_RS_ENCRYPTION_KEY_TYPE = values.Value(
default="RSA",
environ_name="OIDC_RS_ENCRYPTION_KEY_TYPE",
environ_prefix=None,
)
# External API Configuration
# Configure available routes and actions for external_api endpoints
EXTERNAL_API = values.DictValue(
default={
"documents": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": [
"list",
"retrieve",
"create",
"children",
],
},
"document_access": {
"enabled": False,
"actions": [],
},
"document_invitation": {
"enabled": False,
"actions": [],
},
"users": {
"enabled": True,
"actions": ["get_me"],
},
},
environ_name="EXTERNAL_API",
environ_prefix=None,
)
ALLOW_LOGOUT_GET_METHOD = values.BooleanValue(
default=True, environ_name="ALLOW_LOGOUT_GET_METHOD", environ_prefix=None
)

View file

@ -74,6 +74,20 @@ spec:
serviceName: {{ include "impress.backend.fullname" . }}
servicePort: {{ .Values.backend.service.port }}
{{- end }}
- path: /external_api
{{- if semverCompare ">=1.18-0" $.Capabilities.KubeVersion.GitVersion }}
pathType: Prefix
{{- end }}
backend:
{{- if semverCompare ">=1.19-0" $.Capabilities.KubeVersion.GitVersion }}
service:
name: {{ include "impress.backend.fullname" $ }}
port:
number: {{ $.Values.backend.service.port }}
{{- else }}
serviceName: {{ include "impress.backend.fullname" $ }}
servicePort: {{ $.Values.backend.service.port }}
{{- end }}
{{- with .Values.ingress.customBackends }}
{{- toYaml . | nindent 10 }}
{{- end }}
@ -110,6 +124,20 @@ spec:
serviceName: {{ include "impress.backend.fullname" $ }}
servicePort: {{ $.Values.backend.service.port }}
{{- end }}
- path: /external_api
{{- if semverCompare ">=1.18-0" $.Capabilities.KubeVersion.GitVersion }}
pathType: Prefix
{{- end }}
backend:
{{- if semverCompare ">=1.19-0" $.Capabilities.KubeVersion.GitVersion }}
service:
name: {{ include "impress.backend.fullname" $ }}
port:
number: {{ $.Values.backend.service.port }}
{{- else }}
serviceName: {{ include "impress.backend.fullname" $ }}
servicePort: {{ $.Values.backend.service.port }}
{{- end }}
{{- with $.Values.ingress.customBackends }}
{{- toYaml . | nindent 10 }}
{{- end }}

View file

@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ leac@^0.6.0:
resolved "https://registry.yarnpkg.com/leac/-/leac-0.6.0.tgz#dcf136e382e666bd2475f44a1096061b70dc0912"
integrity sha512-y+SqErxb8h7nE/fiEX07jsbuhrpO9lL8eca7/Y1nuWV2moNlXhyd59iDGcRf6moVyDMbmTNzL40SUyrFU/yDpg==
lodash@>=4.17.23, lodash@^4.17.21:
lodash@^4.17.21:
version "4.17.23"
resolved "https://registry.yarnpkg.com/lodash/-/lodash-4.17.23.tgz#f113b0378386103be4f6893388c73d0bde7f2c5a"
integrity sha512-LgVTMpQtIopCi79SJeDiP0TfWi5CNEc/L/aRdTh3yIvmZXTnheWpKjSZhnvMl8iXbC1tFg9gdHHDMLoV7CnG+w==