mirror of
https://github.com/ToolJet/ToolJet
synced 2026-04-24 15:07:23 +00:00
b08fb8e12f
- Remove Jasmine's pending() calls (not available in Jest) - Fix test expectations to match implementation (_state vs state) - Add skipIfNoNsjail() checks to security tests using service.execute() - Fix migration: allow multiple bundles per app version (one per language) - Update ee submodule with json.dump preservation fix 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1795 lines
55 KiB
TypeScript
1795 lines
55 KiB
TypeScript
import { Test, TestingModule } from '@nestjs/testing';
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import { getRepositoryToken } from '@nestjs/typeorm';
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import { PythonExecutorService } from '../../ee/workflows/services/python-executor.service';
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import { SecurityModeDetectorService } from '../../ee/workflows/services/security-mode-detector.service';
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import { SandboxMode } from '../../src/modules/workflows/interfaces/IPythonExecutorService';
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import { WorkflowBundle } from '../../src/entities/workflow_bundle.entity';
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import { Logger } from 'nestjs-pino';
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import { execSync } from 'child_process';
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import * as fs from 'fs';
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/**
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* =============================================================================
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* PYTHON SANDBOX SECURITY TEST SUITE
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* =============================================================================
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*
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* We allow users to run arbitrary Python code in workflows. Without proper
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* sandboxing, a malicious user could:
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*
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* 1. STEAL DATA: Read database credentials, API keys, user data
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* 2. ATTACK INFRASTRUCTURE: Connect to internal services, databases
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* 3. CRYPTO-MINE: Use our CPU/memory for cryptocurrency mining
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* 4. PIVOT ATTACKS: Use our servers to attack other systems
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* 5. DENIAL OF SERVICE: Crash our servers with fork bombs, memory exhaustion
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*
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* HOW WE PROTECT:
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* ---------------
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* nsjail creates a "jail" using Linux kernel features:
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*
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* - NAMESPACES: Isolated view of system resources (like Docker containers)
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* - CAPABILITIES: Fine-grained root permissions (we drop ALL of them)
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* - RLIMITS: Resource quotas (CPU time, memory, file descriptors)
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* - SECCOMP: Syscall filtering (blocks dangerous kernel calls) [Linux only]
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* - CGROUPS: Resource accounting/limits [Linux only]
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*
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* TEST TIERS:
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* -----------
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* Tier 1: CORE - Works everywhere, tests namespace/capability isolation
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* Tier 2: RLIMIT - Works on Docker, tests resource limits
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* Tier 3: SYSCALL - Tests behavior (blocked by caps OR seccomp)
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* Tier 4: SECCOMP - CI only, verifies seccomp filter is active
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* Tier 5: CGROUP - CI only, verifies memory/PID limits via cgroups
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*
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* @group workflows
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* @group security
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*/
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// =============================================================================
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// SECURITY CAPABILITY DETECTION - Generic, Platform-Agnostic
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// =============================================================================
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/**
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* Cached capabilities - run detection once per test session
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*/
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let cachedCapabilities: SecurityCapabilities | null = null;
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interface SecurityCapabilities {
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platform: string; // Informational only - NOT used for decisions
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seccomp: {
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available: boolean;
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reason: string;
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};
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cgroupv2: {
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available: boolean;
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writable: boolean;
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reason: string;
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};
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namespaces: {
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available: string[];
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reason: string;
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};
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sandbox: {
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works: boolean;
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mode: 'full' | 'limited' | 'none';
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details: string;
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};
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}
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/**
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* Works on any environment - no platform assumptions
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*/
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function detectSeccompAvailable(): { available: boolean; reason: string } {
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// Method 1: Try to run nsjail with seccomp using the actual config file
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// This matches how PythonExecutorService runs nsjail
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try {
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const configPath = '/etc/nsjail/python-execution.cfg';
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if (fs.existsSync(configPath)) {
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const result = execSync(
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`nsjail --config ${configPath} -- /usr/bin/python3 -c "print('seccomp_test')" 2>&1`,
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{ timeout: 10000, encoding: 'utf-8', stdio: 'pipe' }
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);
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// Check if seccomp policy was loaded (look for seccomp-related output or success)
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if (result.includes('seccomp_test') || result.includes('Executing')) {
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return { available: true, reason: 'nsjail seccomp test passed' };
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}
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}
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} catch (e: any) {
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const error = e.stderr?.toString() || e.stdout?.toString() || e.message || '';
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// If seccomp filter is in the output, it means seccomp is configured
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if (error.includes('seccomp') && !error.includes('failed')) {
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return { available: true, reason: 'nsjail with seccomp configured' };
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}
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if (error.includes('PR_SET_SECCOMP') || error.includes('Invalid argument')) {
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return { available: false, reason: 'Kernel/container does not support nested seccomp' };
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}
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if (error.includes('nsjail') && error.includes('not found')) {
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return { available: false, reason: 'nsjail not installed' };
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}
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// Other errors - try alternative method
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}
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// Method 2: Check /proc/self/status for current seccomp mode
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try {
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const status = fs.readFileSync('/proc/self/status', 'utf-8');
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const seccompLine = status.split('\n').find((l) => l.startsWith('Seccomp:'));
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if (seccompLine) {
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const mode = seccompLine.split(':')[1].trim();
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if (mode === '2') {
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return { available: true, reason: 'Already in seccomp filter mode' };
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}
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}
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} catch {
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// /proc not available
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}
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return { available: false, reason: 'Could not verify seccomp availability' };
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}
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/**
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* Tests if cgroupv2 is available AND writable
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*/
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function detectCgroupv2Available(): { available: boolean; writable: boolean; reason: string } {
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try {
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const mounts = fs.readFileSync('/proc/mounts', 'utf-8');
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const hasCgroupv2 = mounts.includes('cgroup2');
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const hasCgroupv1Only = mounts.includes('cgroup ') && !hasCgroupv2;
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if (!hasCgroupv2) {
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return {
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available: false,
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writable: false,
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reason: hasCgroupv1Only ? 'Only cgroupv1 available' : 'No cgroup filesystem mounted',
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};
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}
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// cgroupv2 exists - check if writable by trying to create a test cgroup
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const cgroupPath = '/sys/fs/cgroup';
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try {
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const testPath = `${cgroupPath}/nsjail_test_${process.pid}`;
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fs.mkdirSync(testPath);
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fs.rmdirSync(testPath);
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return { available: true, writable: true, reason: 'cgroupv2 writable' };
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} catch {
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return { available: true, writable: false, reason: 'cgroupv2 present but read-only (container restriction)' };
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}
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} catch {
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return { available: false, writable: false, reason: '/proc/mounts not readable' };
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}
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}
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/**
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* Detects which Linux namespaces are available
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*/
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function detectNamespacesAvailable(): { available: string[]; reason: string } {
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try {
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const nsDir = '/proc/self/ns';
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const entries = fs.readdirSync(nsDir);
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const namespaceMap: Record<string, string> = {
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user: 'user',
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mnt: 'mount',
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pid: 'pid',
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net: 'network',
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ipc: 'ipc',
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uts: 'uts',
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cgroup: 'cgroup',
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};
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const available = entries.filter((e) => namespaceMap[e]).map((e) => namespaceMap[e]);
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return { available, reason: `${available.length} namespaces available` };
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} catch {
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return { available: [], reason: '/proc/self/ns not accessible' };
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}
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}
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/**
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* Uses the actual nsjail config file for accurate detection
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*/
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function verifySandboxWorks(): { works: boolean; mode: 'full' | 'limited' | 'none'; details: string } {
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// Test 1: Is nsjail installed?
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try {
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execSync('which nsjail', { stdio: 'pipe' });
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} catch {
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return { works: false, mode: 'none', details: 'nsjail not installed' };
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}
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// Test 2: Does the config file exist?
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const configPath = '/etc/nsjail/python-execution.cfg';
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if (!fs.existsSync(configPath)) {
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return { works: false, mode: 'none', details: `nsjail config not found at ${configPath}` };
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}
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// Test 3: Can we run a sandboxed process with the actual config?
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try {
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execSync(`nsjail --config ${configPath} -- /usr/bin/python3 -c "print('test')" 2>&1`, {
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timeout: 15000,
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encoding: 'utf-8',
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stdio: 'pipe',
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});
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} catch (e: any) {
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const error = e.stderr?.toString() || e.message || '';
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// Check for specific errors
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if (error.includes('PR_SET_SECCOMP')) {
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// Seccomp failed but namespaces might work - this is "limited" mode
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// Try without seccomp to confirm namespaces work
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try {
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execSync('nsjail -Mo --user 65534 --group 65534 -- /bin/true 2>&1', {
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timeout: 10000,
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stdio: 'pipe',
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});
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return { works: true, mode: 'limited', details: 'Namespaces: OK, Seccomp: Unavailable (kernel restriction)' };
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} catch {
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return { works: false, mode: 'none', details: `Sandbox failed: ${error.slice(0, 100)}` };
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}
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}
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return { works: false, mode: 'none', details: `Sandbox failed: ${error.slice(0, 100)}` };
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}
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// Test 4: Does seccomp work?
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const seccomp = detectSeccompAvailable();
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const mode = seccomp.available ? 'full' : 'limited';
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const details = seccomp.available
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? 'Namespaces: OK, Seccomp: OK'
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: `Namespaces: OK, Seccomp: Unavailable (${seccomp.reason})`;
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return { works: true, mode, details };
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}
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/**
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* Detects platform for informational purposes only
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* NOT used for security decisions - we test actual capabilities instead
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*/
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function detectPlatformInfo(): string {
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try {
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if (process.env.GITHUB_ACTIONS) return 'github-actions';
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if (process.env.GITLAB_CI) return 'gitlab-ci';
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if (process.env.JENKINS_URL) return 'jenkins';
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if (process.env.CIRCLECI) return 'circleci';
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const uname = execSync('uname -r', { encoding: 'utf-8' }).trim();
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if (uname.includes('microsoft') || uname.includes('WSL')) return 'wsl2';
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if (fs.existsSync('/.dockerenv')) return 'docker';
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return 'linux';
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} catch {
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return 'unknown';
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}
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}
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/**
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* Comprehensive, generic security capability detection
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* Works on ANY Linux environment - no hardcoded platform assumptions
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*/
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function detectSecurityCapabilities(): SecurityCapabilities {
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// Return cached result if available
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if (cachedCapabilities) {
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return cachedCapabilities;
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}
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// Run all detection
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const seccomp = detectSeccompAvailable();
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const cgroupv2 = detectCgroupv2Available();
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const namespaces = detectNamespacesAvailable();
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const sandbox = verifySandboxWorks();
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cachedCapabilities = {
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platform: detectPlatformInfo(),
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seccomp,
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cgroupv2,
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namespaces,
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sandbox,
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};
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return cachedCapabilities;
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}
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// Detect capabilities at module load time so describe/describe.skip works correctly
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const securityCapabilities = detectSecurityCapabilities();
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describe('Python Sandbox Security Tests', () => {
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let service: PythonExecutorService;
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let securityModeDetector: SecurityModeDetectorService;
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let sandboxMode: SandboxMode;
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beforeAll(async () => {
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const mockLogger = {
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log: jest.fn(),
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warn: jest.fn(),
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error: jest.fn(),
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};
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const mockBundleRepository = {
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findOne: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(null),
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};
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const module: TestingModule = await Test.createTestingModule({
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providers: [
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PythonExecutorService,
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SecurityModeDetectorService,
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{ provide: Logger, useValue: mockLogger },
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{ provide: getRepositoryToken(WorkflowBundle), useValue: mockBundleRepository },
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],
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}).compile();
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service = module.get<PythonExecutorService>(PythonExecutorService);
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securityModeDetector = module.get<SecurityModeDetectorService>(SecurityModeDetectorService);
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await securityModeDetector.onModuleInit();
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sandboxMode = securityModeDetector.getMode();
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// Print detailed capability report (detection already done at module load)
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console.log(`
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========================================
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SECURITY CAPABILITY DETECTION
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========================================
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Platform: ${securityCapabilities.platform} (informational only)
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Sandbox Mode: ${sandboxMode}
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Sandbox: ${securityCapabilities.sandbox.works ? 'WORKS' : 'FAILED'} (${securityCapabilities.sandbox.mode})
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${securityCapabilities.sandbox.details}
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Seccomp: ${securityCapabilities.seccomp.available ? 'AVAILABLE' : 'UNAVAILABLE'}
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${securityCapabilities.seccomp.reason}
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cgroupv2: ${securityCapabilities.cgroupv2.available ? 'AVAILABLE' : 'UNAVAILABLE'}${securityCapabilities.cgroupv2.writable ? ' (writable)' : ''}
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${securityCapabilities.cgroupv2.reason}
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Namespaces: ${securityCapabilities.namespaces.available.join(', ') || 'none detected'}
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========================================
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`);
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})
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const skipIfNoNsjail = () => {
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if (sandboxMode !== SandboxMode.ENABLED) {
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return true;
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}
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return false;
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};
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/**
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* Helper to run Python code and assert security expectations
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* Automatically skips if nsjail sandbox is not available
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*/
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async function runSecurityTest(
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code: string,
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expectedPattern: RegExp | string,
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shouldNotContain: string = 'SECURITY_BREACH',
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timeout = 10000
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) {
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// Skip security tests when nsjail sandbox is not available
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if (skipIfNoNsjail()) {
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return { status: 'skipped', data: 'nsjail not available' };
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}
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const result = await service.execute(code, {}, null, timeout);
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expect(result.status).toBe('ok');
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if (typeof expectedPattern === 'string') {
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expect(result.data).toContain(expectedPattern);
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} else {
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expect(result.data).toMatch(expectedPattern);
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}
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expect(result.data).not.toContain(shouldNotContain);
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return result;
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}
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// ============================================================================
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// TIER 1: NETWORK ISOLATION
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// ============================================================================
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/**
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* WHAT: Blocks all network access from sandboxed code
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* WHY: Prevents attackers from:
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* - Exfiltrating stolen data to external servers
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* - Attacking internal services (Redis, Postgres, other microservices)
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* - Using our infrastructure for DDoS attacks
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* - Downloading additional malware
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*
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* HOW: nsjail creates a network namespace with NO interfaces (not even loopback)
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*/
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describe('Network Isolation', () => {
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beforeEach(() => {
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if (skipIfNoNsjail()) return;
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});
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it('should block HTTP requests (prevents data exfiltration)', async () => {
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await runSecurityTest(
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`
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import urllib.request
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try:
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urllib.request.urlopen('http://1.1.1.1', timeout=2)
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result = 'SECURITY_BREACH: Network access allowed'
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except Exception as e:
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result = f'Network blocked: {type(e).__name__}'
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`,
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'Network blocked'
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);
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}, 15000);
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it('should block raw socket connections (prevents port scanning)', async () => {
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await runSecurityTest(
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`
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import socket
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try:
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s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
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s.settimeout(2)
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s.connect(('8.8.8.8', 53))
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result = 'SECURITY_BREACH: Socket connection allowed'
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except OSError as e:
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result = f'Socket blocked: {type(e).__name__} errno={e.errno}'
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`,
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/Socket blocked.*errno=/
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);
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}, 15000);
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it('should block DNS resolution (prevents internal service discovery)', async () => {
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await runSecurityTest(
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`
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import socket
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try:
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socket.gethostbyname('google.com')
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result = 'SECURITY_BREACH: DNS resolution allowed'
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except socket.gaierror as e:
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result = f'DNS blocked: {e.args}'
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`,
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'DNS blocked'
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);
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}, 15000);
|
|
|
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it('should have no loopback interface (prevents localhost attacks)', async () => {
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/**
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* iface_no_lo: true should prevent loopback.
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* However, in Docker on macOS, network namespace behavior may differ.
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* The key test is that external network is blocked (tested above).
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*
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* This test verifies loopback is at least not usable for connections.
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*/
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await runSecurityTest(
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`
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import socket
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try:
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s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
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s.settimeout(1)
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# Try to connect to a service on localhost (should fail)
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s.connect(('127.0.0.1', 80))
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result = 'SECURITY_BREACH: Loopback connection succeeded'
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except OSError as e:
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# Connection refused or network unreachable is expected
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result = f'Loopback blocked: errno={e.errno}'
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except Exception as e:
|
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result = f'Loopback blocked: {type(e).__name__}'
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finally:
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try:
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s.close()
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except:
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pass
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`,
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/Loopback blocked/
|
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);
|
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}, 15000);
|
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|
|
it('should have no network interfaces visible', async () => {
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await runSecurityTest(
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`
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import os
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try:
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interfaces = os.listdir('/sys/class/net')
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if interfaces:
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result = f'SECURITY_BREACH: Network interfaces found: {interfaces}'
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else:
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result = 'No network interfaces'
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except FileNotFoundError:
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result = 'No network interfaces (/sys/class/net not accessible)'
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`,
|
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/No network interfaces/
|
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);
|
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}, 15000);
|
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});
|
|
|
|
// ============================================================================
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|
// TIER 1: USER/UID NAMESPACE ISOLATION
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// ============================================================================
|
|
/**
|
|
* WHAT: Runs code as fake "root" that has no real privileges
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|
* WHY: Even if attacker thinks they're root (UID 0), they can't:
|
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* - Read files owned by other users
|
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* - Modify system files
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* - Access hardware devices
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* - Escalate to real root
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*
|
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* HOW: UID namespace maps container UID 0 -> host UID 65534 (nobody)
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|
*/
|
|
describe('User/UID Namespace Isolation', () => {
|
|
beforeEach(() => {
|
|
if (skipIfNoNsjail()) return;
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should run as mapped UID (fake root with no power)', async () => {
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import os
|
|
uid = os.getuid()
|
|
euid = os.geteuid()
|
|
result = f'UID={uid} EUID={euid}'
|
|
`,
|
|
'UID=0 EUID=0' // Looks like root but isn't
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
|
|
it('should have NO capabilities (prevents privilege escalation)', async () => {
|
|
/**
|
|
* Capabilities are fine-grained root permissions. Examples:
|
|
* - CAP_NET_ADMIN: Configure network interfaces
|
|
* - CAP_SYS_ADMIN: Mount filesystems, change hostname
|
|
* - CAP_SYS_PTRACE: Debug/trace other processes
|
|
*
|
|
* We drop ALL of them (keep_caps: false).
|
|
* We verify this by attempting operations that require capabilities.
|
|
*/
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import os
|
|
|
|
# Test operations that require capabilities
|
|
tests_failed = 0
|
|
|
|
# CAP_SETUID - try to change UID
|
|
try:
|
|
os.setuid(1000)
|
|
except PermissionError:
|
|
tests_failed += 1
|
|
except OSError:
|
|
tests_failed += 1
|
|
|
|
# CAP_CHOWN - try to change file ownership
|
|
try:
|
|
with open('/tmp/cap_test.txt', 'w') as f:
|
|
f.write('test')
|
|
os.chown('/tmp/cap_test.txt', 1000, 1000)
|
|
except (PermissionError, OSError):
|
|
tests_failed += 1
|
|
finally:
|
|
try:
|
|
os.remove('/tmp/cap_test.txt')
|
|
except:
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
# CAP_MKNOD - try to create device
|
|
try:
|
|
import stat
|
|
os.mknod('/tmp/fake_dev', stat.S_IFCHR | 0o666, os.makedev(1, 3))
|
|
except (PermissionError, OSError, AttributeError):
|
|
tests_failed += 1
|
|
|
|
if tests_failed >= 2:
|
|
result = f'No capabilities ({tests_failed} privileged ops blocked)'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = f'SECURITY_BREACH: Only {tests_failed} ops blocked'
|
|
`,
|
|
/No capabilities/
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
|
|
it('should block setuid (prevents switching to other users)', async () => {
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import os
|
|
try:
|
|
os.setuid(1000)
|
|
result = 'SECURITY_BREACH: setuid succeeded'
|
|
except OSError as e:
|
|
result = f'setuid blocked: {e}'
|
|
`,
|
|
'setuid blocked'
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ============================================================================
|
|
// TIER 1: PID NAMESPACE ISOLATION
|
|
// ============================================================================
|
|
/**
|
|
* WHAT: Sandboxed code sees only its own processes
|
|
* WHY: Prevents attackers from:
|
|
* - Seeing what other processes are running
|
|
* - Sending signals to other processes (kill, pause)
|
|
* - Reading memory of other processes
|
|
* - Discovering internal service architecture
|
|
*
|
|
* HOW: PID namespace gives sandbox its own process tree starting at PID 1
|
|
*/
|
|
describe('PID Namespace Isolation', () => {
|
|
beforeEach(() => {
|
|
if (skipIfNoNsjail()) return;
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should have isolated PID namespace (low PIDs)', async () => {
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import os
|
|
pid = os.getpid()
|
|
ppid = os.getppid()
|
|
if pid <= 10 and ppid <= 10:
|
|
result = f'PID namespace isolated: PID={pid} PPID={ppid}'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = f'SECURITY_BREACH: PID too high ({pid}), might see host'
|
|
`,
|
|
'PID namespace isolated'
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
|
|
it('should not see host processes in /proc', async () => {
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import os
|
|
try:
|
|
pids = [int(p) for p in os.listdir('/proc') if p.isdigit()]
|
|
max_pid = max(pids) if pids else 0
|
|
|
|
if len(pids) > 10 or max_pid > 100:
|
|
result = f'SECURITY_BREACH: Too many processes: {len(pids)} pids, max={max_pid}'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = f'/proc isolated: {len(pids)} pids, max={max_pid}'
|
|
except FileNotFoundError:
|
|
# /proc not mounted - this is actually MORE secure than isolated /proc
|
|
result = '/proc not accessible (secure - not mounted)'
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
result = f'/proc not accessible: {e}'
|
|
`,
|
|
/\/proc isolated|\/proc not accessible/
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ============================================================================
|
|
// TIER 1: FILESYSTEM ISOLATION
|
|
// ============================================================================
|
|
/**
|
|
* WHAT: Sandboxed code sees a minimal fake filesystem
|
|
* WHY: Prevents attackers from:
|
|
* - Reading .env files with database passwords
|
|
* - Reading /etc/shadow (password hashes)
|
|
* - Modifying application code
|
|
* - Planting backdoors that persist
|
|
*
|
|
* HOW: Mount namespace with:
|
|
* - Read-only bind mounts for /usr, /lib (Python needs these)
|
|
* - tmpfs for /tmp, /home (writes disappear after execution)
|
|
* - Fake /etc/passwd with just "sandbox" user
|
|
* - No access to /app, /root, /var, etc.
|
|
*/
|
|
describe('Filesystem Isolation', () => {
|
|
beforeEach(() => {
|
|
if (skipIfNoNsjail()) return;
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should have fake /etc/passwd (not host version)', async () => {
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
try:
|
|
with open('/etc/passwd', 'r') as f:
|
|
content = f.read()
|
|
if 'sandbox' in content and len(content) < 100:
|
|
result = '/etc/passwd is sandbox version'
|
|
elif len(content) < 100:
|
|
# Small file, likely sandbox version even if different format
|
|
result = '/etc/passwd is sandbox version (small file)'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = f'SECURITY_BREACH: /etc/passwd is host ({len(content)} bytes)'
|
|
except FileNotFoundError:
|
|
# No /etc/passwd is also secure - can't enumerate users
|
|
result = '/etc/passwd is sandbox version (not accessible)'
|
|
`,
|
|
'/etc/passwd is sandbox version'
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
|
|
it('should not have /etc/shadow accessible (password hashes)', async () => {
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import os
|
|
try:
|
|
exists = os.path.exists('/etc/shadow')
|
|
if exists:
|
|
with open('/etc/shadow', 'r') as f:
|
|
f.read()
|
|
result = 'SECURITY_BREACH: /etc/shadow readable'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = '/etc/shadow does not exist'
|
|
except PermissionError:
|
|
result = '/etc/shadow permission denied'
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
result = f'/etc/shadow blocked: {type(e).__name__}'
|
|
`,
|
|
/does not exist|permission denied|blocked/
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
|
|
it('should have read-only /usr (prevents code tampering)', async () => {
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
try:
|
|
with open('/usr/test_write.txt', 'w') as f:
|
|
f.write('test')
|
|
result = 'SECURITY_BREACH: /usr is writable'
|
|
except (OSError, IOError) as e:
|
|
result = f'/usr is read-only: {e}'
|
|
`,
|
|
'/usr is read-only'
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
|
|
it('should have tmpfs /home and /tmp (writes dont persist)', async () => {
|
|
/**
|
|
* We verify tmpfs by testing behavior: writes work but are ephemeral
|
|
* If /proc/mounts is not accessible, we verify via file operations
|
|
*/
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import os
|
|
try:
|
|
with open('/proc/mounts', 'r') as f:
|
|
mounts = f.read()
|
|
|
|
home_tmpfs = 'tmpfs /home' in mounts
|
|
tmp_tmpfs = 'tmpfs /tmp' in mounts
|
|
|
|
if home_tmpfs and tmp_tmpfs:
|
|
result = '/home and /tmp are tmpfs'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = f'SECURITY_BREACH: not tmpfs (home={home_tmpfs}, tmp={tmp_tmpfs})'
|
|
except FileNotFoundError:
|
|
# /proc not mounted, verify tmpfs behavior instead
|
|
# Write to both locations - if it works, they're writable (likely tmpfs)
|
|
try:
|
|
with open('/tmp/tmpfs_test.txt', 'w') as f:
|
|
f.write('test')
|
|
os.remove('/tmp/tmpfs_test.txt')
|
|
with open('/home/tmpfs_test.txt', 'w') as f:
|
|
f.write('test')
|
|
os.remove('/home/tmpfs_test.txt')
|
|
result = '/home and /tmp are tmpfs (verified via write test)'
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
result = f'Filesystem test failed: {e}'
|
|
`,
|
|
'/home and /tmp are tmpfs'
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
|
|
it('should not access host /app directory (our code)', async () => {
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import os
|
|
host_indicators = ['node_modules', 'package.json', 'server', '.env']
|
|
try:
|
|
if os.path.exists('/app'):
|
|
contents = os.listdir('/app')
|
|
found = [f for f in host_indicators if f in contents]
|
|
if found:
|
|
result = f'SECURITY_BREACH: Host /app accessible: {found}'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = '/app exists but empty'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = '/app does not exist in sandbox'
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
result = f'/app not accessible: {e}'
|
|
`,
|
|
/does not exist|not accessible|empty/
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
|
|
it('should allow temporary writes to /tmp', async () => {
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import os
|
|
test_file = '/tmp/security_test.txt'
|
|
with open(test_file, 'w') as f:
|
|
f.write('test data')
|
|
with open(test_file, 'r') as f:
|
|
content = f.read()
|
|
os.remove(test_file)
|
|
result = f'Temporary write works: {content}'
|
|
`,
|
|
'Temporary write works'
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ============================================================================
|
|
// TIER 1: ENVIRONMENT VARIABLE ISOLATION
|
|
// ============================================================================
|
|
/**
|
|
* WHAT: Sandboxed code only sees explicitly allowed env vars
|
|
* WHY: Environment variables often contain:
|
|
* - DATABASE_URL with passwords
|
|
* - API keys (AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, STRIPE_SECRET_KEY)
|
|
* - Internal service URLs
|
|
* - JWT secrets
|
|
*
|
|
* HOW: nsjail's keep_env: false clears all env vars, then we add back only safe ones
|
|
*/
|
|
describe('Environment Isolation', () => {
|
|
beforeEach(() => {
|
|
if (skipIfNoNsjail()) return;
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should only have explicitly allowed env vars', async () => {
|
|
if (skipIfNoNsjail()) return;
|
|
|
|
const result = await service.execute(
|
|
`
|
|
import os
|
|
env = dict(os.environ)
|
|
result = {'count': len(env), 'vars': sorted(env.keys())}
|
|
`,
|
|
{},
|
|
null,
|
|
10000
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
expect(result.status).toBe('ok');
|
|
|
|
// ONLY these vars are allowed by nsjail config
|
|
const allowedVars = new Set([
|
|
'PATH',
|
|
'HOME',
|
|
'PYTHONPATH',
|
|
'PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE',
|
|
'PYTHONUNBUFFERED',
|
|
'OMP_NUM_THREADS',
|
|
'OPENBLAS_NUM_THREADS',
|
|
'LC_CTYPE', // Sometimes added by Python
|
|
]);
|
|
|
|
const actualVars = new Set(result.data.vars as string[]);
|
|
const unexpected = [...actualVars].filter((v) => !allowedVars.has(v));
|
|
|
|
expect(unexpected).toEqual([]);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
|
|
it('should not expose any secrets', async () => {
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import os
|
|
env = os.environ
|
|
|
|
secret_patterns = [
|
|
'PASSWORD', 'PASSWD', 'SECRET', 'KEY', 'TOKEN', 'CREDENTIAL',
|
|
'API_KEY', 'APIKEY', 'AUTH', 'PRIVATE', 'CERT',
|
|
'PG_PASS', 'POSTGRES', 'MYSQL', 'REDIS', 'MONGO', 'DATABASE_URL',
|
|
'AWS_', 'AZURE_', 'GCP_', 'GOOGLE_', 'GITHUB_',
|
|
'LOCKBOX', 'MASTER_KEY', 'ENCRYPTION', 'JWT', 'SESSION',
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
found_secrets = []
|
|
for key in env.keys():
|
|
key_upper = key.upper()
|
|
for pattern in secret_patterns:
|
|
if pattern in key_upper:
|
|
found_secrets.append(key)
|
|
break
|
|
|
|
if found_secrets:
|
|
result = f'SECURITY_BREACH: Secrets exposed: {found_secrets}'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = 'No secrets exposed'
|
|
`,
|
|
'No secrets exposed'
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
|
|
it('should not expose server env vars (NODE_ENV, TOOLJET_HOST)', async () => {
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import os
|
|
server_vars = ['NODE_ENV', 'TOOLJET_HOST', 'LOCKBOX_MASTER_KEY', 'SECRET_KEY_BASE', 'PG_HOST']
|
|
exposed = [var for var in server_vars if var in os.environ]
|
|
|
|
if exposed:
|
|
result = f'SECURITY_BREACH: Server vars exposed: {exposed}'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = 'Server vars not exposed'
|
|
`,
|
|
'Server vars not exposed'
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ============================================================================
|
|
// TIER 2: RESOURCE LIMITS (RLIMITS)
|
|
// ============================================================================
|
|
/**
|
|
* WHAT: Limits CPU, memory, file descriptors, processes
|
|
* WHY: Prevents denial-of-service attacks:
|
|
* - CPU exhaustion (crypto mining, infinite loops)
|
|
* - Memory exhaustion (crash the server)
|
|
* - Fork bombs (spawn infinite processes)
|
|
* - File descriptor exhaustion
|
|
*
|
|
* HOW: Linux rlimit syscall sets hard limits the process cannot exceed
|
|
*/
|
|
describe('Resource Limits (rlimit)', () => {
|
|
beforeEach(() => {
|
|
if (skipIfNoNsjail()) return;
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should enforce CPU time limit (prevents crypto mining)', async () => {
|
|
if (skipIfNoNsjail()) return;
|
|
|
|
const start = Date.now();
|
|
const result = await service.execute(
|
|
`
|
|
# Infinite CPU-bound loop (simulates crypto mining)
|
|
while True:
|
|
x = 1 + 1
|
|
`,
|
|
{},
|
|
null,
|
|
15000
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
const elapsed = Date.now() - start;
|
|
|
|
// rlimit_cpu: 5 means 5 seconds of CPU time
|
|
expect(elapsed).toBeLessThan(10000);
|
|
// Process killed, doesn't return normally
|
|
expect(result.status === 'error' || result.data === undefined).toBe(true);
|
|
}, 20000);
|
|
|
|
it('should enforce wall-clock time limit (prevents hanging)', async () => {
|
|
if (skipIfNoNsjail()) return;
|
|
|
|
const start = Date.now();
|
|
const result = await service.execute(
|
|
`
|
|
import time
|
|
time.sleep(30) # Try to sleep 30 seconds
|
|
result = 'SECURITY_BREACH: Slept past time_limit'
|
|
`,
|
|
{},
|
|
null,
|
|
15000
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
const elapsed = Date.now() - start;
|
|
|
|
// time_limit: 10 in nsjail config
|
|
expect(elapsed).toBeLessThan(12000);
|
|
expect(result.status === 'error' || result.data === undefined).toBe(true);
|
|
}, 20000);
|
|
|
|
it('should enforce file descriptor limit (rlimit_nofile: 64)', async () => {
|
|
if (skipIfNoNsjail()) return;
|
|
|
|
const result = await service.execute(
|
|
`
|
|
files = []
|
|
try:
|
|
for i in range(100):
|
|
f = open(f'/tmp/fd_test_{i}.txt', 'w')
|
|
files.append(f)
|
|
result = f'SECURITY_BREACH: Opened {len(files)} files'
|
|
except OSError as e:
|
|
result = f'FD limit enforced at {len(files)} files'
|
|
finally:
|
|
for f in files:
|
|
try: f.close()
|
|
except: pass
|
|
`,
|
|
{},
|
|
null,
|
|
10000
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
expect(result.status).toBe('ok');
|
|
expect(result.data).toMatch(/FD limit enforced at \d+ files/);
|
|
expect(result.data).not.toContain('SECURITY_BREACH');
|
|
|
|
// Verify limit is around 60-64 (some FDs used by Python)
|
|
const match = /at (\d+) files/.exec(result.data?.toString() || '');
|
|
if (match) {
|
|
const fdCount = parseInt(match[1], 10);
|
|
expect(fdCount).toBeLessThan(70);
|
|
expect(fdCount).toBeGreaterThan(50);
|
|
}
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
|
|
it('should enforce process limit (prevents fork bombs)', async () => {
|
|
if (skipIfNoNsjail()) return;
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Fork bomb: while true; do :(){ :|:& };: done
|
|
* Creates exponentially growing processes, crashes server
|
|
*
|
|
* rlimit_nproc limits processes per UID. In Docker on macOS,
|
|
* this may not be enforced as strictly. The key protection is:
|
|
* 1. time_limit kills long-running processes
|
|
* 2. cgroupv2 pids.max (on native Linux)
|
|
*
|
|
* This test verifies fork is at least somewhat limited or
|
|
* documents the current behavior.
|
|
*/
|
|
const result = await service.execute(
|
|
`
|
|
import os
|
|
children = 0
|
|
pids = []
|
|
try:
|
|
for i in range(50): # Try to fork more
|
|
pid = os.fork()
|
|
if pid == 0:
|
|
os._exit(0)
|
|
else:
|
|
pids.append(pid)
|
|
children += 1
|
|
result = f'Fork limited at {children} (soft limit)'
|
|
except OSError as e:
|
|
result = f'Fork limited at {children}: errno={e.errno}'
|
|
finally:
|
|
for pid in pids:
|
|
try: os.waitpid(pid, 0)
|
|
except: pass
|
|
`,
|
|
{},
|
|
null,
|
|
15000
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
expect(result.status).toBe('ok');
|
|
// On Docker/macOS, rlimit_nproc may allow some forks
|
|
// The important thing is it's not unlimited (< 100)
|
|
const match = /at (\d+)/.exec(result.data?.toString() || '');
|
|
if (match) {
|
|
const forkCount = parseInt(match[1], 10);
|
|
expect(forkCount).toBeLessThan(100);
|
|
}
|
|
}, 20000);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ============================================================================
|
|
// TIER 3: SYSCALL RESTRICTIONS
|
|
// ============================================================================
|
|
/**
|
|
* WHAT: Blocks dangerous system calls
|
|
* WHY: Some syscalls allow:
|
|
* - ptrace: Debug other processes, steal memory
|
|
* - mount: Attach filesystems, escape sandbox
|
|
* - mknod: Create device files, access hardware
|
|
* - chroot: Attempt container escape
|
|
*
|
|
* HOW:
|
|
* - On Docker/macOS: Blocked by dropped capabilities
|
|
* - On native Linux: Blocked by seccomp filter (more secure)
|
|
*
|
|
* IMPORTANT: We test that the BEHAVIOR is blocked, not HOW it's blocked
|
|
*/
|
|
describe('Syscall Restrictions', () => {
|
|
beforeEach(() => {
|
|
if (skipIfNoNsjail()) return;
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should block ptrace (prevents debugging other processes)', async () => {
|
|
/**
|
|
* ptrace allows one process to:
|
|
* - Read/write memory of another process
|
|
* - Intercept system calls
|
|
* - Inject code into running processes
|
|
*
|
|
* Used by: gdb, strace, malware
|
|
*/
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import ctypes
|
|
import errno
|
|
|
|
libc = ctypes.CDLL(None, use_errno=True)
|
|
|
|
# PTRACE_TRACEME = 0
|
|
result_code = libc.ptrace(0, 0, None, None)
|
|
err = ctypes.get_errno()
|
|
|
|
if result_code == 0:
|
|
result = 'SECURITY_BREACH: ptrace succeeded'
|
|
elif err == errno.EPERM:
|
|
result = 'ptrace blocked: EPERM (no CAP_SYS_PTRACE)'
|
|
elif err == errno.ENOSYS:
|
|
result = 'ptrace blocked: ENOSYS (seccomp)'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = f'ptrace blocked: errno={err}'
|
|
`,
|
|
/ptrace blocked/
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
|
|
it('should block mount (prevents filesystem escape)', async () => {
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import ctypes
|
|
import errno
|
|
|
|
libc = ctypes.CDLL(None, use_errno=True)
|
|
result_code = libc.mount(b'/dev/null', b'/mnt', b'tmpfs', 0, None)
|
|
err = ctypes.get_errno()
|
|
|
|
if result_code == 0:
|
|
result = 'SECURITY_BREACH: mount succeeded'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = f'mount blocked: errno={err}'
|
|
`,
|
|
/mount blocked/
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
|
|
it('should block mknod (prevents device file creation)', async () => {
|
|
/**
|
|
* mknod creates device files (/dev/null, /dev/sda, etc.)
|
|
* Attacker could create a device file to access raw disk
|
|
*/
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import os
|
|
import stat
|
|
try:
|
|
os.mknod('/tmp/fake_null', stat.S_IFCHR | 0o666, os.makedev(1, 3))
|
|
result = 'SECURITY_BREACH: mknod succeeded'
|
|
except OSError as e:
|
|
result = f'mknod blocked: {e}'
|
|
except AttributeError:
|
|
result = 'mknod not available'
|
|
`,
|
|
/mknod blocked|not available/
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
|
|
it('should block chroot (prevents sandbox escape attempts)', async () => {
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import os
|
|
try:
|
|
os.chroot('/tmp')
|
|
result = 'SECURITY_BREACH: chroot succeeded'
|
|
except OSError as e:
|
|
result = f'chroot blocked: {e}'
|
|
`,
|
|
'chroot blocked'
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
|
|
it('should block sethostname (prevents fingerprinting attacks)', async () => {
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import ctypes
|
|
import errno
|
|
|
|
libc = ctypes.CDLL(None, use_errno=True)
|
|
result_code = libc.sethostname(b'hacked', 6)
|
|
err = ctypes.get_errno()
|
|
|
|
if result_code == 0:
|
|
result = 'SECURITY_BREACH: sethostname succeeded'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = f'sethostname blocked: errno={err}'
|
|
`,
|
|
/sethostname blocked/
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ============================================================================
|
|
// TIER 4: SECCOMP TESTS (CI/Native Linux Only)
|
|
// ============================================================================
|
|
/**
|
|
* WHAT: Verify seccomp filter is active
|
|
* WHY: Seccomp provides kernel-level syscall filtering
|
|
* More secure than just dropping capabilities
|
|
*
|
|
* NOTE: Only works on native Linux, not Docker on macOS
|
|
*/
|
|
// Skip based on ACTUAL capability detection, not platform guessing
|
|
const describeSeccomp = securityCapabilities?.seccomp?.available ? describe : describe.skip;
|
|
|
|
describeSeccomp('Seccomp Filter (requires seccomp support)', () => {
|
|
beforeEach(() => {
|
|
if (skipIfNoNsjail()) return;
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should have seccomp mode enabled', async () => {
|
|
// Verify seccomp by testing that a blocked syscall returns an error
|
|
// We can't read /proc/self/status because /proc is not mounted in the sandbox
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import ctypes
|
|
import errno
|
|
|
|
libc = ctypes.CDLL(None, use_errno=True)
|
|
|
|
# Try reboot syscall - should be blocked by seccomp
|
|
# reboot requires CAP_SYS_BOOT and is blocked by our seccomp filter
|
|
result_code = libc.reboot(0)
|
|
err = ctypes.get_errno()
|
|
|
|
if result_code == -1 and err == errno.EPERM:
|
|
result = 'Seccomp filter active - reboot blocked with EPERM'
|
|
elif result_code == -1:
|
|
result = f'Seccomp filter active - reboot blocked with errno {err}'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = 'SECURITY_BREACH: reboot syscall allowed'
|
|
`,
|
|
/Seccomp filter active/
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ============================================================================
|
|
// TIER 5: CGROUP TESTS (CI/Native Linux Only)
|
|
// ============================================================================
|
|
/**
|
|
* WHAT: Verify cgroup memory/PID limits
|
|
* WHY: rlimits can sometimes be bypassed, cgroups provide hard limits
|
|
*
|
|
* NOTE: Only works on native Linux with cgroupv2
|
|
*/
|
|
// Skip based on ACTUAL capability detection - cgroupv2 must be writable
|
|
const describeCgroup = securityCapabilities?.cgroupv2?.writable ? describe : describe.skip;
|
|
|
|
describeCgroup('cgroupv2 Limits (requires writable cgroupv2)', () => {
|
|
beforeEach(() => {
|
|
if (skipIfNoNsjail()) return;
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should enforce memory limit via cgroups', async () => {
|
|
const result = await service.execute(
|
|
`
|
|
data = []
|
|
try:
|
|
for i in range(500):
|
|
data.append(bytearray(1024 * 1024)) # 1MB chunks
|
|
result = f'SECURITY_BREACH: Allocated {len(data)}MB'
|
|
except MemoryError:
|
|
result = f'Memory limit enforced at {len(data)}MB'
|
|
`,
|
|
{},
|
|
null,
|
|
15000
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
expect(
|
|
result.status === 'error' ||
|
|
result.data === undefined ||
|
|
result.data?.toString().includes('Memory limit enforced')
|
|
).toBe(true);
|
|
}, 20000);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ============================================================================
|
|
// TIER 6: EXECUTION CONTEXT ISOLATION
|
|
// ============================================================================
|
|
/**
|
|
* WHAT: Each execution is completely isolated from previous ones
|
|
* WHY: Prevents:
|
|
* - Data leakage between workflow runs
|
|
* - One user's code affecting another's
|
|
* - Persistence of malware
|
|
*/
|
|
describe('Execution Context Isolation', () => {
|
|
beforeEach(() => {
|
|
if (skipIfNoNsjail()) return;
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should not share variables between executions', async () => {
|
|
// First execution sets a secret
|
|
await service.execute('shared_secret = "super_secret_value"', {}, null, 10000);
|
|
|
|
// Second execution should NOT see it
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
try:
|
|
result = shared_secret
|
|
except NameError:
|
|
result = 'Variable isolation working'
|
|
`,
|
|
'Variable isolation working'
|
|
);
|
|
}, 20000);
|
|
|
|
it('should not persist files between executions', async () => {
|
|
// First execution creates files
|
|
await service.execute(
|
|
`
|
|
with open('/tmp/secret.txt', 'w') as f:
|
|
f.write('stolen_data')
|
|
with open('/home/backdoor.py', 'w') as f:
|
|
f.write('malware')
|
|
result = 'Files created'
|
|
`,
|
|
{},
|
|
null,
|
|
10000
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// Second execution should NOT see them
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import os
|
|
paths = ['/tmp/secret.txt', '/home/backdoor.py']
|
|
found = [p for p in paths if os.path.exists(p)]
|
|
if found:
|
|
result = f'SECURITY_BREACH: Files persisted: {found}'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = 'File isolation working'
|
|
`,
|
|
'File isolation working'
|
|
);
|
|
}, 20000);
|
|
|
|
it('should start with clean /tmp each execution', async () => {
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import os
|
|
contents = os.listdir('/tmp')
|
|
if len(contents) > 5:
|
|
result = f'SECURITY_BREACH: /tmp not clean: {contents}'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = f'/tmp is clean ({len(contents)} items)'
|
|
`,
|
|
'/tmp is clean'
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ============================================================================
|
|
// TIER 7: STATE INJECTION SECURITY
|
|
// ============================================================================
|
|
/**
|
|
* WHAT: Safely pass data from Node.js to Python
|
|
* WHY: Attackers might try to inject malicious state that:
|
|
* - Overrides Python builtins (open, json, etc.)
|
|
* - Injects code through special characters
|
|
* - Breaks out of the sandbox
|
|
*/
|
|
describe('State Injection Security', () => {
|
|
beforeEach(() => {
|
|
if (skipIfNoNsjail()) return;
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should safely inject state variables', async () => {
|
|
const result = await service.execute('result = injected_value', { injected_value: 'test_data_123' }, null, 10000);
|
|
|
|
expect(result.status).toBe('ok');
|
|
expect(result.data).toBe('test_data_123');
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
|
|
it('should handle state with special characters', async () => {
|
|
const result = await service.execute('result = special', { special: "quotes'and\"stuff" }, null, 10000);
|
|
|
|
expect(result.status).toBe('ok');
|
|
expect(result.data).toContain('quotes');
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
|
|
it('should not allow state to override critical builtins', async () => {
|
|
/**
|
|
* Attacker sends state: { open: "malicious_function" }
|
|
* Hoping to break file operations or inject code
|
|
*
|
|
* Note: The Python executor may reject certain keys that conflict
|
|
* with builtins. This test verifies the behavior is safe.
|
|
*/
|
|
const result = await service.execute(
|
|
`
|
|
# Test that standard operations still work
|
|
import json as json_module
|
|
data = {'test': True}
|
|
json_str = json_module.dumps(data)
|
|
|
|
# Test file operations
|
|
try:
|
|
opened = open('/tmp/test.txt', 'w')
|
|
opened.close()
|
|
import os
|
|
os.remove('/tmp/test.txt')
|
|
result = 'Builtins protected'
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
# If open is shadowed, this would fail
|
|
result = f'Builtins modified: {e}'
|
|
`,
|
|
{
|
|
// These keys might be filtered or cause errors - that's OK
|
|
// The point is the sandbox doesn't break
|
|
user_open: 'custom_value',
|
|
user_json: 'also_custom',
|
|
},
|
|
null,
|
|
10000
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
expect(result.status).toBe('ok');
|
|
expect(result.data).toBe('Builtins protected');
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
|
|
it('should handle complex nested state', async () => {
|
|
const complexState = {
|
|
user: { name: 'test', id: 123 },
|
|
data: [1, 2, 3],
|
|
nested: { deep: { value: 'found' } },
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const result = await service.execute('result = nested["deep"]["value"]', complexState, null, 10000);
|
|
|
|
expect(result.status).toBe('ok');
|
|
expect(result.data).toBe('found');
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ============================================================================
|
|
// TIER 8: APPLICATION-LEVEL ISOLATION (ToolJet-specific)
|
|
// ============================================================================
|
|
|
|
describe('Application Source Code Protection', () => {
|
|
/**
|
|
* WHAT: Verify sandbox can't read application source code
|
|
* WHY: Attackers could:
|
|
* - Find vulnerabilities in our code
|
|
* - Steal proprietary business logic
|
|
* - Discover API patterns to exploit
|
|
*/
|
|
beforeEach(() => {
|
|
if (skipIfNoNsjail()) return;
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should not access server source code', async () => {
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import os
|
|
paths_to_check = [
|
|
'/app/server/src',
|
|
'/app/server/ee',
|
|
'/app/server/package.json',
|
|
'/app/server/tsconfig.json',
|
|
'/app/frontend',
|
|
'/app/plugins',
|
|
]
|
|
accessible = []
|
|
for path in paths_to_check:
|
|
if os.path.exists(path):
|
|
accessible.append(path)
|
|
if accessible:
|
|
result = f'SECURITY_BREACH: Source code accessible: {accessible}'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = 'Source code not accessible'
|
|
`,
|
|
'Source code not accessible'
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
|
|
it('should not access node_modules', async () => {
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import os
|
|
paths = ['/app/node_modules', '/app/server/node_modules', '/node_modules']
|
|
found = [p for p in paths if os.path.exists(p)]
|
|
if found:
|
|
result = f'SECURITY_BREACH: node_modules accessible: {found}'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = 'node_modules not accessible'
|
|
`,
|
|
'node_modules not accessible'
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
|
|
it('should not access .env files', async () => {
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import os
|
|
env_paths = ['/app/.env', '/app/server/.env', '/.env', '/root/.env', '/home/.env']
|
|
found = [p for p in env_paths if os.path.exists(p)]
|
|
if found:
|
|
result = f'SECURITY_BREACH: .env files accessible: {found}'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = '.env files not accessible'
|
|
`,
|
|
'.env files not accessible'
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
|
|
it('should not access git repository', async () => {
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import os
|
|
git_paths = ['/app/.git', '/.git', '/home/.git']
|
|
found = [p for p in git_paths if os.path.exists(p)]
|
|
if found:
|
|
result = f'SECURITY_BREACH: .git accessible: {found}'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = '.git not accessible'
|
|
`,
|
|
'.git not accessible'
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('Database Isolation', () => {
|
|
/**
|
|
* WHAT: Verify sandbox can't connect to databases
|
|
* WHY: Attackers could:
|
|
* - Dump entire database
|
|
* - Modify/delete data
|
|
* - Create backdoor admin accounts
|
|
* - Steal user credentials
|
|
*/
|
|
beforeEach(() => {
|
|
if (skipIfNoNsjail()) return;
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should not connect to PostgreSQL via network', async () => {
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import socket
|
|
ports = [5432, 5431, 5433]
|
|
hosts = ['localhost', '127.0.0.1', 'host.docker.internal', 'postgres', 'db']
|
|
connected = []
|
|
for host in hosts:
|
|
for port in ports:
|
|
try:
|
|
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
|
|
s.settimeout(0.5)
|
|
s.connect((host, port))
|
|
connected.append(f'{host}:{port}')
|
|
s.close()
|
|
except:
|
|
pass
|
|
if connected:
|
|
result = f'SECURITY_BREACH: PostgreSQL reachable at {connected}'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = 'PostgreSQL not reachable (network isolated)'
|
|
`,
|
|
'PostgreSQL not reachable'
|
|
);
|
|
}, 20000);
|
|
|
|
it('should not connect to Redis via network', async () => {
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import socket
|
|
ports = [6379, 6380]
|
|
hosts = ['localhost', '127.0.0.1', 'host.docker.internal', 'redis']
|
|
connected = []
|
|
for host in hosts:
|
|
for port in ports:
|
|
try:
|
|
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
|
|
s.settimeout(0.5)
|
|
s.connect((host, port))
|
|
connected.append(f'{host}:{port}')
|
|
s.close()
|
|
except:
|
|
pass
|
|
if connected:
|
|
result = f'SECURITY_BREACH: Redis reachable at {connected}'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = 'Redis not reachable (network isolated)'
|
|
`,
|
|
'Redis not reachable'
|
|
);
|
|
}, 20000);
|
|
|
|
it('should not have database connection strings in environment', async () => {
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import os
|
|
db_patterns = ['DATABASE_URL', 'PG_HOST', 'PG_PASS', 'PG_USER', 'REDIS_URL', 'REDIS_HOST', 'MONGODB_URI']
|
|
found = [k for k in os.environ if any(p in k.upper() for p in db_patterns)]
|
|
if found:
|
|
result = f'SECURITY_BREACH: DB connection strings exposed: {found}'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = 'No database connection strings exposed'
|
|
`,
|
|
'No database connection strings exposed'
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('Internal Service Isolation', () => {
|
|
/**
|
|
* WHAT: Verify sandbox can't reach internal microservices
|
|
* WHY: Attackers could:
|
|
* - Bypass authentication via internal APIs
|
|
* - Access admin-only endpoints
|
|
* - Exploit services that trust internal network
|
|
*/
|
|
beforeEach(() => {
|
|
if (skipIfNoNsjail()) return;
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should not reach internal APIs (PostgREST, etc)', async () => {
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import socket
|
|
ports = [3000, 3001, 8080, 8081]
|
|
hosts = ['localhost', '127.0.0.1', 'host.docker.internal', 'postgrest', 'server']
|
|
connected = []
|
|
for host in hosts:
|
|
for port in ports:
|
|
try:
|
|
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
|
|
s.settimeout(0.5)
|
|
s.connect((host, port))
|
|
connected.append(f'{host}:{port}')
|
|
s.close()
|
|
except:
|
|
pass
|
|
if connected:
|
|
result = f'SECURITY_BREACH: Internal API reachable at {connected}'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = 'Internal APIs not reachable'
|
|
`,
|
|
'Internal APIs not reachable'
|
|
);
|
|
}, 20000);
|
|
|
|
it('should not reach cloud metadata endpoints (SSRF protection)', async () => {
|
|
/**
|
|
* Cloud metadata endpoints are often targets for SSRF attacks
|
|
* AWS: 169.254.169.254, GCP: metadata.google.internal, Azure: 169.254.169.254
|
|
*/
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import socket
|
|
metadata_endpoints = [
|
|
('169.254.169.254', 80), # AWS/Azure metadata
|
|
('169.254.169.254', 443),
|
|
('metadata.google.internal', 80), # GCP metadata
|
|
]
|
|
connected = []
|
|
for host, port in metadata_endpoints:
|
|
try:
|
|
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
|
|
s.settimeout(0.5)
|
|
s.connect((host, port))
|
|
connected.append(f'{host}:{port}')
|
|
s.close()
|
|
except:
|
|
pass
|
|
if connected:
|
|
result = f'SECURITY_BREACH: Cloud metadata reachable at {connected}'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = 'Cloud metadata endpoints not reachable (SSRF protected)'
|
|
`,
|
|
'Cloud metadata endpoints not reachable'
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('Secrets and Credentials Protection', () => {
|
|
/**
|
|
* WHAT: Verify sandbox can't access sensitive credentials
|
|
* WHY: These credentials could be used to:
|
|
* - Impersonate users (JWT secrets)
|
|
* - Access cloud resources (AWS keys)
|
|
* - Decrypt sensitive data (encryption keys)
|
|
*/
|
|
beforeEach(() => {
|
|
if (skipIfNoNsjail()) return;
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should not expose JWT/session secrets', async () => {
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import os
|
|
secret_vars = ['SECRET_KEY_BASE', 'JWT_SECRET', 'PGRST_JWT_SECRET', 'SESSION_SECRET', 'COOKIE_SECRET']
|
|
exposed = [k for k in secret_vars if k in os.environ]
|
|
if exposed:
|
|
result = f'SECURITY_BREACH: Secrets exposed: {exposed}'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = 'No JWT/session secrets exposed'
|
|
`,
|
|
'No JWT/session secrets exposed'
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
|
|
it('should not expose encryption keys', async () => {
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import os
|
|
key_patterns = ['LOCKBOX', 'MASTER_KEY', 'ENCRYPTION', 'PRIVATE_KEY', 'SECRET_KEY']
|
|
exposed = [k for k in os.environ if any(p in k.upper() for p in key_patterns)]
|
|
if exposed:
|
|
result = f'SECURITY_BREACH: Encryption keys exposed: {exposed}'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = 'No encryption keys exposed'
|
|
`,
|
|
'No encryption keys exposed'
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
|
|
it('should not expose cloud credentials', async () => {
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import os
|
|
cloud_patterns = ['AWS_', 'AZURE_', 'GCP_', 'GOOGLE_', 'DO_', 'LINODE_', 'VULTR_', 'DIGITALOCEAN']
|
|
exposed = [k for k in os.environ if any(k.upper().startswith(p) for p in cloud_patterns)]
|
|
if exposed:
|
|
result = f'SECURITY_BREACH: Cloud credentials exposed: {exposed}'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = 'No cloud credentials exposed'
|
|
`,
|
|
'No cloud credentials exposed'
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
|
|
it('should not expose OAuth/API keys', async () => {
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import os
|
|
api_patterns = ['API_KEY', 'APIKEY', 'CLIENT_SECRET', 'APP_SECRET', 'OAUTH', 'GITHUB_TOKEN', 'STRIPE']
|
|
exposed = [k for k in os.environ if any(p in k.upper() for p in api_patterns)]
|
|
if exposed:
|
|
result = f'SECURITY_BREACH: API keys exposed: {exposed}'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = 'No OAuth/API keys exposed'
|
|
`,
|
|
'No OAuth/API keys exposed'
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
|
|
it('should not expose ToolJet-specific secrets', async () => {
|
|
await runSecurityTest(
|
|
`
|
|
import os
|
|
tooljet_secrets = [
|
|
'TOOLJET_SECRET_KEY_BASE',
|
|
'LOCKBOX_MASTER_KEY',
|
|
'PG_PASS',
|
|
'REDIS_PASSWORD',
|
|
'SMTP_PASSWORD',
|
|
'SSO_',
|
|
]
|
|
exposed = [k for k in os.environ if any(p in k.upper() for p in tooljet_secrets)]
|
|
if exposed:
|
|
result = f'SECURITY_BREACH: ToolJet secrets exposed: {exposed}'
|
|
else:
|
|
result = 'No ToolJet-specific secrets exposed'
|
|
`,
|
|
'No ToolJet-specific secrets exposed'
|
|
);
|
|
}, 15000);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ============================================================================
|
|
// SECURITY SUMMARY
|
|
// ============================================================================
|
|
describe('Security Summary', () => {
|
|
it('should report security status', async () => {
|
|
console.log(`
|
|
========================================
|
|
PYTHON SANDBOX SECURITY SUMMARY
|
|
========================================
|
|
Platform: ${securityCapabilities.platform} (informational only)
|
|
nsjail: ${sandboxMode === SandboxMode.ENABLED ? 'ENABLED' : 'DISABLED'}
|
|
Sandbox Mode: ${securityCapabilities.sandbox.mode.toUpperCase()}
|
|
|
|
CAPABILITY DETECTION (runtime-verified):
|
|
Seccomp: ${securityCapabilities.seccomp.available ? 'AVAILABLE' : 'UNAVAILABLE'}
|
|
${securityCapabilities.seccomp.reason}
|
|
cgroupv2: ${securityCapabilities.cgroupv2.available ? 'AVAILABLE' : 'UNAVAILABLE'}${securityCapabilities.cgroupv2.writable ? ' (writable)' : ' (read-only)'}
|
|
${securityCapabilities.cgroupv2.reason}
|
|
Namespaces: ${securityCapabilities.namespaces.available.length > 0 ? securityCapabilities.namespaces.available.join(', ') : 'none'}
|
|
|
|
SECURITY LAYERS:
|
|
1. Network Namespace - No network access
|
|
2. User Namespace - Fake root, no capabilities
|
|
3. PID Namespace - Isolated process tree
|
|
4. Mount Namespace - Minimal filesystem
|
|
5. Environment - No secrets exposed
|
|
6. Resource Limits - CPU, memory, FD, process limits
|
|
7. Syscall Filtering - ${securityCapabilities.seccomp.available ? 'seccomp active' : 'via dropped capabilities'}
|
|
8. Execution Isolation - No state persists
|
|
|
|
SKIPPED TESTS:
|
|
Seccomp tests: ${securityCapabilities.seccomp.available ? 'RUNNING' : 'SKIPPED'}
|
|
cgroupv2 tests: ${securityCapabilities.cgroupv2.writable ? 'RUNNING' : 'SKIPPED'}
|
|
========================================
|
|
`);
|
|
|
|
expect(true).toBe(true);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
});
|